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Abstract
In Europe’s biggest wave of refugees since World War II, over 1 million
people fleeing protracted conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan crossed the
Mediterranean on unseaworthy boats in 2015 in a desperate bid to reach the continent.
Rather than uniting to deal with the humanitarian situation, the European Union (EU),
the world’s wealthiest and most integrated bloc, struggled to effectively manage the
flow of refugees. Amid rising anti-immigration sentiment and nascent
Euroscepticism, EU governments employed unilateral and security-driven responses
aimed at limiting the number of refugees that would enter Europe. Europe’s Refugee
Crisis, as it came to be known, has unsettled the EU like no crisis ever before. This
thesis demonstrates that populist right wing parties are responsible for the staunch
anti-immigrant sentiment as well as the increasingly restrictive policies on asylum in
Europe. By examining France and Germany, the EU’s two founding members, this
thesis shows that populist right wing parties sowed political discontent by portraying
migrants as a threat to jobs and to national identity. These messages achieved
widespread acceptance, even mainstream status, in large part because establishment
parties validated right wing discourse and demands in a desperate effort to retain their
appeal to voters. The result was a marked shift to the right on immigration and
asylum policies. That, in turn, has increased the suffering of thousands of people who
have sought refuge in Europe. The rise of right-wing populist parties in Europe and
the consequent resurgence of nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment also puts at
risk the entire EU project: the creation of an integrated continent based on liberal
values.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Against the backdrop of unprecedented numbers of people being displaced by
conflicts worldwide1, over 1 million asylum seekers and migrants crossed the
Mediterranean on unseaworthy boats in 2015 in a desperate bid to reach European
shores.2 That same year, over 3 thousand people died or drowned while making the
journey. The world witnessed wrenching scenes of hysterical families trying to reach
Europe and images of drowning children. Despite repeated calls by human rights
groups, the member states of the European Union (EU) did not open safe and legal
pathways for refugees to seek asylum.3 This, however, did not deter people,
predominantly from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq from fleeing protracted conflicts and
persecution in their countries. They kept coming, mostly on flimsy boats or on foot
through dangerous land routes – often paying smugglers.
Instead of adopting a unified approach that would have shared the
responsibility for taking in refugees, European states opted to enforce unilateral
actions that contrasted with their declared values and with international treaties on
refugees. 4 States erected fences first with states outside of the EU, but later between
EU states, including members of Europe’s passport-free area, the Schengen zone. The
fences, often manned by armed guards, blocked refugees, diverted their passage or
trapped them to open fields. Macedonia built a fence along its border with Greece,
blocking a key transit route. Greece built a fence and electronic surveillance system
1

According to UNHCR a record high of 65.3 million people were displaced due to conflict and
persecution in 2015. Available on http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2016/6/5763b65a4/globalforced-displacement-hits-record-high.html
2
Find more data http://data.unhcrorg/mediterranean/regional.php
3
See more info: https://www.fidh.org/en/region/europe-central-asia/16060-deaths-on-themediterranean-european-states-should-create-legal-safe
4
Newland et al., 2016
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along its border with Turkey. Austria erected a barrier along its border with Slovenia
and capped the numbers of people it would admit, as well as how many it would
allow to cross into Germany. As tensions rose, on March 18, 2016, the EU heads of
state reached consensus on a deal that, in effect, outsourced the problem to Turkey. In
exchange for Turkey’s stemming the flow of refugees to the EU and agreeing to
provide a haven for those refugees repatriated by European states, the EU promised to
accelerate visa liberalization for Turkish nationals and pledged more than $6 billion
towards the assistance of Turkey’s refugee population. The transactional nature of the
deal which focuses solely on migration management, sparked condemnations from
rights groups, who also argued that the agreement was in violation of EU law and
international human rights law.5 The fate of the deal is now uncertain because of
tensions between the two sides and political instability in Turkey.
The thousands of refugees who had hoped to reach the United Kingdom
through the English Channel encountered rejection. Britain built an even higher wall
topped with razor wire around the undersea tunnel—one that was heavily policed.
Thousands of people were trapped in the Jungle, as the Calais camp came to be
called, among them hundreds of unaccompanied minors. The trash-strewn camp,
which was set up on a former landfill site, also came to symbolize the EU
governments’ unwillingness to cooperate with one another on their humanitarian
obligations as well as their lack of empathy for the plight of refugees. After the
camp’s permanence became a growing source of embarrassment for the French and
the British governments, the refugees were relocated to multiple other holding

5
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facilities around Paris in October 2016, two years after the Jungle was first set up.
The camp was razed.
1.1 Argument
In this thesis, I will argue that the roots of this lack of cooperation lie in
domestic politics. The prevailing attitude in Europe toward refugees is that they are
economically driven migrants who are unworthy of asylum in Europe or potential
terrorists who must be kept out. As I will show, using polls taken over the years and
direct quotes from political actors, right-wing political leaders have produced and
shaped this lack of empathy towards refugees. Right-wing populist leaders in the EU
have politicized the issue of asylum, framing it as a crisis, an existential threat to
European Christian identity and an economic burden. They have mobilized people
around the idea that migration poses a security threat and therefore warrants
containment. They have also monopolized the debate on migration, in large part due
to their ability to sell their fear-based messages to publics, but also due to the
mainstream’s unwillingness to directly confront or challenge such messages. This has
led to the shunning of any discussion on the reasons people seek asylum, on the
benefits of migration in an aging European workforce, or the assistance of refugees as
a humanitarian obligation and a public good. Liberal and left wing parties have
shifted to the right on the refugee issue, so as not to be outflanked by the increasingly
influential populist anti-immigrant right.
I point out how right wing populist parties were a fringe movement in Europe
just twenty years ago; today they have firmly established themselves in the
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mainstream in over half a dozen countries.6 And where right-wing populists have not
gained power, they are enjoying unprecedented popularity. These parties, which are
opposed to the basic cooperative and humanitarian principles of the EU, hamper
mainstream leaders’ ability to allocate funds towards refugee assistance or to put in
place even limited resettlement policies. Far right parties do so by challenging ruling
governments through the spreading of often unsubstantiated messages that exaggerate
the risks and costs of the assistance of refugees. They instead propose securitycentered solutions as the only viable option, swaying public support in their direction.
The populist messages, which appeal to nationalism, the collective and the personal
interests of people, have stoked anxieties by connecting immigration to crime,
terrorism and a loss of identity. A security response to migration now shapes asylum
and migration policy across much of Europe.
1.2 Organization
This thesis is organized into six parts. The first chapter will define right wing
populism through a review of the most prominent literature on the topic and provide
an outline of which parties in Europe can be categorized as populist. I will discuss the
recent ascent of these parties and address the ways in which a continued rise in their
popularity could shape the entire political sphere. The rise of anti-immigrant
populism also has humanitarian consequences: thousands of refugees have to contend
with a Europe that is increasingly restricting its rules on asylum. I then define the key
terms refugee, asylum seeker and migrant and introduce my case studies, Germany
and France. The second chapter provides a brief historical survey of the emergence
and evolution of the European Union. I mention the 2009 Euro Crisis as a defining
6

Malone, 3
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moment in the evolution of the European integration project, as it has led to a loss of
faith in EU institutions. I then provide a concise history of migration to Europe,
tracing its advent to the labor shortages of the post-war reconstruction period. I
conclude by demonstrating how populism in Europe emerged in the early 1980s in
response to increased migration and to populist actors who began to gain ground
running on anti-immigration platforms. The third chapter outlines European states’
response to the refugee flows, even before they were declared to be a crisis and show
how it largely pandered to the populist agenda of keeping migrants out. I discuss
European identity, the construction of Muslims as “the other,” as well as some of the
laws that have been designed to limit the religious and social freedoms of Europe’s
Muslim citizens. I argue that populist parties are responsible for the widespread
perception that Muslims do not and cannot belong in Europe, which in turn has
formed the basis for populism’s opposition to admitting Muslim migrants from Syria
or Iraq. Finally, I discuss mainstreaming, which is establishment parties’ effort to
appropriate politically successful populist ideas in an effort to recapture lost votes and
to undercut the appeal of populism. The fourth and fifth chapters are the case studies
of Germany and France respectively. I discuss each country’s confrontation with
populism and the uniqueness of each case. I demonstrate how despite variation in the
conditions under which populism emerged or is maintained, establishment parties’
response to right wing populism has been similar: cooption of ideas that restrict
migration and an overall shift to the right. The sixth section offers concluding
thoughts on the rise of populism and its likely effects on Europe’s future.

9

1.3 What is right-wing populism?
Hans-Georg Betz suggests that right-wing populist parties are first and
foremost right wing in their rejection of individual and social equality and of political
projects that seek to achieve it.7 Their right wing politics is further manifested in their
opposition to social integration of marginalized groups and in their appeal to
xenophobia. Jan-Werner Müller defines populism as an exclusionary form of identity
politics that is based on a constructed definition of “the people” which excludes
minority groups, foreigners and immigrants.8 For Cas Mudde, populism lacks an
ideology of its own and assimilates ideas from other ideologies so as to capitalize on
latent economic and political grievances in society. For Mudde, right wing populist
parties in Europe have largely combined with authoritarianism and nativism,
considering society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic
camps. They have created a distinct “us” versus “them” approach using religion and
culture as the basis for the divide.9 Populist authoritarianism emphasizes “law and
order” and nativism propagates the idea that states should be inhabited exclusively by
members of the native group, presenting foreigners, immigrants and asylum seekers
as a threat to the homogeneity and identity of the nation-state. Betz observes that
amid the emergence of a more multicultural and diverse society in Europe, right wing
populist parties have promoted themselves as the advocates and the guardians of the
exclusive European national identity.10 They appeal to xenophobia and reject the
principle of social equality and inclusion based on a civic conception of nationalism.
7

Betz, H. (1994). Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. The Review of Politics, 55(4). p, 4
Muller, 2
9
Mudde, 34
10
Betz, H. (1993) ‘The new politics of resentment: Radical right-wing populist parties in western
Europe’, Comparative Politics, 25(4), p, 417
8
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Their ideology starts from the assumption of basic inequality where the native
population should come first and have priority over jobs and welfare provisions.
For political theorist Ernesto Laclau, populism is the very essence of politics
and its emancipatory force. 11 Populism is the very logic of the political, and therefore
all politics are by definition, populist.12 For Mudde, populism poses a danger to
democracy since it requires pluralism and the recognition of finding terms of living
together as free, equal, but also diverse citizens.13 For Laclau, populism is a radical
form of democracy and the rise of populism reintroduces conflict into politics and
mobilizes the excluded sectors of society – ultimately challenging the status quo.
The populist right has focused much of its political fire on Islam, the religion
of the majority of the more established migrant populations in Europe, as well that of
the recent arrivals from war-ravaged countries. These parties have been able to frame
the question of Islam in terms of their level of integration, their belonging and in the
context of the larger challenges confronting European identity. Central to right wing
populist mobilization is the discussion over whether or not Muslims can or should
even be accorded a permanent place in Western society.14
1.4 What are the populist parties in Europe?
The Front National, the Alternative for Germany, the Dutch Freedom Party,
the Danish People’s Party, the Sweden Democrats, the True Finns, the Swiss People’s
Party, and the Norwegian Progressive Party, have all made electoral gains in their
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Laclau, 2005
Laclau, 47
13
Muller, 3
14
Wodak, R., Khosravinik, M. and Mral, B. (2014). Right-wing populism in Europe. 1st ed. London:
Bloomsbury Academic, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing. p, 72
12
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electoral polls by almost exclusively focusing on anti-immigration and anti-Islam.15
Populist right wing parties are also opposed to European cooperation under the EU:
they are Eurosceptic. Their recent surge in popularity has put immense pressure on
ruling governments on the assistance of refugees, whether sea rescues, allocation of
money or permanent re settlement – all of which require cooperation with EU states.
Concerned over losing popularity to the surging populist movements, mainstream
parties have emulated their positions on migration and adopted their nationalistic
rhetoric, in some cases making a significant shift to the right.
1.5 Implications
Europe’s handling of the refugee crisis has wide implications beyond the
impact on the lives of the thousands of people who remain in legal limbo while living
in makeshift camps, are stranded on the streets of major European cities or held in
camps in Greece. Since 2011, the war in Syria has created nearly 6 million refugees.
An additional 1 million people fled the wars raging in Iraq and Afghanistan. These
refugees are entitled to protection under international law, as they face death or
persecution if returned home.16 Meanwhile, millions of refugees remain stranded in
squalid camps in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon – developing countries who continue
to be the hosts of the vast majority of refugees. In that context, Europe’s treatment of
refugees, apart from being in direct violation of signed agreement, chiefly the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees – sets a very low standard for
cooperation and states’ humanitarian responsibility towards refugees.

15

Ibid, 14
See more info: http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflicttracker/p32137#!/conflict/refugee-crisis-inthe-european-union
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Refugee and human rights groups have criticized the EU for failing to put in
place a unified response as well as failing to comply with their own asylum standards
and signed human rights treaties. Human Rights Watch characterized the EU’s
response as “dismal” and lacking in leadership, vision and solidarity.17 Roberts et al.
wrote that Europe’s response had a “preoccupation with numbers” that too often
ignored the individual treatment of refugees, failing to provide the most basic health
and safety standards.18 The responsibility to care for asylum seekers was largely left
to civil society and volunteer organizations. The state abdicated its traditional role.
For Newland, many governments pursued “the three Ds” of denial, diversion and
deterrence, with only a few others making some efforts to rescue, protect and find
ways to share the responsibility.19 The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) noted that a year after the crisis peaked, thousands were still
sleeping in tents and open areas in freezing temperatures. Thousands of others were
held in crowded detention centers, awaiting responses to their applications. The
organization also reported that states were exceedingly slow in fulfilling resettlement
pledges, with only 6,259 refugees relocated from Greece by December 2016 – less
than 10 percent of pledged numbers under the EU scheme.20
1.6 Definitions
A migrant according to the UNHCR describes any person who moves across
an international border, to join family members already abroad, in search for work, in

17

See full Human Rights Watch reports: https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/european-union
Roberts, B., Murphy, A. and McKee, M. (2016) ‘Europe’s collective failure to address the refugee
crisis’, Public Health Reviews, 37(1).
19
Newland et al, 26
20
Find more data: http://data2.unhcr.org/en/news/15792
18
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the quest for education or for a range of other motivations.21 By contrast, a refugee
flees armed conflict or persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opinion. Under international law,
he or she requires international protection and cannot be returned home. An asylum
seeker seeks formal protection and cannot be returned to the country they fled from
while their claims are being considered under the principle of nonrefoulement, or
nonreturn – a concept imbedded in international and constitutional law.22
1.7 Case Selection
In this thesis, I will focus on the ascent of two populist movements in
Germany and in France and trace their impact on the states’ migration policy. I will
examine these populist movements’ positions on migration as well as those of the
mainstream political parties to assess the policy shifts that have taken place. I will
examine whether the recent surge in the popularity of right wing populism has the
ability to sway leaders to accommodate their proposals. My project will examine
whether the success of these right-leaning parties has the ability to directly weaken
efforts to cope effectively with the refugee crisis. If this is indeed the case, then we
can expect that their continued popularity is likely to lead to legislation that will
further restrict access to asylum in European states and endanger social and religious
freedoms of minority groups in Europe.
Germany and France merit special attention because they have been the
driving forces behind the formation of the EU and remain essential to its survival and
its future. Germany escaped from the Euro Crisis virtually unscathed, maintains a
21

See more: https://emergency.unhcr.org/entry/44938/migrant-definition
Messina, A. and Lahav, G. (2006). The Migration Reader: Exploring Politics and Policies. 1st ed.
Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner. p, 9-11.
22
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robust economy and low unemployment rates. Meanwhile France has suffered from
years of stagnation and has been dogged for years by a high jobless rate. Germany
and France are both home to a sizeable migrant population and populist parties have
become powerful in both countries. But populism emerged at different times and
under different socio-economic situations in the two countries. The electoral fortunes
of French and German populism have also been different. I intend to show through
my case selection that while populism may differ in its emergence and success from
country to country, what remains similar is the ways in which establishment parties
respond to the threat it poses. My findings should therefore help explain the policy
shifts on migration that have taken place in other European countries with powerful
populist parties, such as Austria, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Italy. The French
and German cases thus provide an opportunity to explore the differences among
populist-right parties, the nuances within populist thought and the different ways in
which populism manifests itself. These two cases provide the ways in which
populism invariably leads to a marked shift to the right in policies on migration, even
on the part of mainstream parties—representing the center, right and even the left.
1.8 Two Cases
In Germany a year after Angela Merkel announced an “open border policy”
for migrants and accepted more than 1 million asylum applications, her party, the
Christian Democratic Union (CDU), was beaten into third place in the 2016
parliamentary elections. The anti-migrant Alternative for Germany party (AfD)
garnered about 21 percent of the vote. 23 In response to the rise of the AfD’s

23

Read: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/04/germanys-far-right-afd-unseats-angela-merkelsparty-in-key-regio/

15

popularity in the polls and her own sagging approval ratings,24 Merkel began
advocating strict anti-Islamist measures, such as banning Muslim women from
donning the full veil in public.25
France is home to the prototypical populist right wing party in Europe, the
National Front (FN), which commands 25 percent of public support, according to
polls.26 In December 2016 its leader Marine Le Pen said she wanted to block free
education for illegal immigrants in France, even though such a policy would
contravene a central French law that guarantees schooling for all children. Despite
having a one of the largest immigrant populations in Europe, France reluctantly
agreed to resettle 30,000 after rejecting a permanent quote system, saying, “We won’t
take any more”27 socialist Prime Minister Manuel Valls said adding, “we cannot
welcome to Europe all those who flee dictatorship in Syria.”28

24

See trends and results of German parties: http://pollytix.eu/pollytix-german-election-trend/
Read full article: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/06/world/europe/merkel-calls-for-ban-on-fullface-veils-in-germany.html
26
Read: http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/735118/French-election-2017-results-latest-polls-oddstracker-win
27
Read: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-idUSKCN0VM0NI
28
Read: https://euobserver.com/migration/131175
25
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Chapter 2: The Birth of Europe
The aftermath of World War II left behind a shattered and impoverished
continent with unlikely prospects of recovering or avoiding the recurrence of war
with its neighbors.29 But things changed quickly. In 1951, Belgium, Germany,
France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands established the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC), which brought under joint control the resources necessary
for making war, and became the first step in European integration. The initial
motivation was to avoid the relapse of war between France and Germany. But less
than a decade later, the continent was not only at peace, it was thriving. The
motivation for further integration shifted towards creating a stronger and more
prosperous union, rather than simply achieving peace. The success of the ECSC
prompted leaders to sign more agreements that further developed common economic
policies and merged their national markets into a single one in which goods, people,
capital and services could move freely. The system established a common external
tarrif, in addition to removing tariffs on trade among member states.30 Starting in the
1970s, more European states joined what was by then referred to as the European
Community (EC). On November 1, 1993, the Maastricht Treaty went into effect,
establishing the modern-day European Union.
For Ernst B. Haas, European integration had a self-sustaining dynamic: it
created the demand for further integration. Integration had a “positive spill-over

29

Read Hitchcock, 2003; Ther, 2016 and Judt, 2005
Find more info: https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/calculation-customs-duties/what-iscommon-customs-tariff_en
30
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effect” where integration in one “functional” area spilled over into other areas.31 And
so the creation of a common market in one sector, coal and steel, led to incentives for
the creation of a general common market allowing for free trade in all goods.
Integration would soon also widen with more European states joining. In the early
2000s the fast-expanding EU became the world's largest trading bloc.32 It awarded its
citizens high standards of living exemplified in its generous welfare system and
affordable medical care. The open border policy, which included the free movement
of people, goods, services and capital, enabled EU citizens to study, live and work in
any EU country.33 The Union also brought democracy and a shared prosperity to a
continent that had been at war since the 16th century. Twelve countries from Central,
Eastern Europe, as well as formerly communist countries joined the EU in two waves
of accession in 2004 and 2007 leading to today’s Union composed of 28 member
states (the UK is due to formally withdraw in 2019).
The Maastricht Treaty resulted in the creation of the Eurozone, in which
participants share a common currency, a common central bank and a common
monetary policy. In the late 1990s, members signed the Schengen Agreement, which
eliminated border controls among participating states.34 The EU is made up of five
institutions: the Commission, the Council of ministers, the European Parliament, the
Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors.35 Together, the EU is a cooperative

Schmitter, P.C. (2005) ‘Ernst B. Haas and the Legacy of Neo-Functionalism’ Journal of European
Public Policy 12/2: 255-272
32
Find more info: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/eu-position-in-world-trade/
33
Bradbury, 20
34
The 26 members participating in the Schengen agreement are: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, and Switzerland
35
Hitchcock, 447
31
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venture in which states agree to give up aspects of their sovereignty in specific areas
in exchange for participation in these institutions. The EU is not static. It is a
constantly evolving set of institutions with far-reaching powers, “a web of
overlapping institutions designed to allow its members to achieve together certain
objective – security, stability, prosperity – that they could not attain alone.”36 The EU
passes and enforces laws that affect nearly every aspect of life in Europe: business,
trade, farming, health and the environment. It has a parliament, a flag, a common
passport and an anthem.37 And yet, it is not a state or a federation. Since its inception
integration continued in a largely upward trajectory revealing a steady level of trust
among states and a majority citizenry who viewed the EU favorably, valuing the
freedoms it afforded them to easily, travel, work and live throughout Europe.
2.1 The Euro Crisis
The year 2009 would prove to be a watershed moment in European history.
The 2008 crisis that began on Wall Street when the US real-estate bubble burst,
spilled over into Europe dealing a heavy blow to the common European currency, the
Euro. Most of the founding EU countries as well as the new members went through
deep recessions. Mediterranean countries, Greece, Italy and Spain were
disproportionally hit by the crisis. Some post-communist countries also suffered deep
slumps. Germany as the wealthiest creditor EU state, took charge of resolving the
crisis. Merkel insisted that bailouts be contingent on severe austerity measures,
budget cuts and reforms. As a result of these measures, salaries and pensions were
slashed, unemployment soared and masses were plunged into poverty. It soon became

36
37

Hitchcock, 435
Ibid
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clear that a default of any of the most affected states would spark its exit from the
euro and potentially a domino effect of crises across Europe. For Greece as well as
some of the other states, membership in the EU not only facilitated the crisis but also
tied their hands in their ability to resolve it, as they were subjected to high interests
rates on loans and had no ability to use the tools of monetary policy, such as
devaluation. Despite showing some signs of recovery, the effects of the crisis still
linger with sluggish economic growth and persistently high unemployment rates in
some states, paving the way for populist parties to argue against the merits of
membership in the EU. It also left behind among citizens a sense of deep distrust in
EU institutions and a disdain towards the EU’s supranational institutions, above all
the Commission and the European Central Bank. Disillusionment with the EU
increased as Europeans’ initial enthusiasm that membership in the union would bring
a higher standard of living, access to better jobs and economic prosperity, was
deflated.
It is on the heels of the Euro crisis, that large flows of asylum seekers began
arriving on Europe’s shores, creating fertile ground for many new or long-dormant
populist parties who wanted to bank on general discontent with the EU. They also had
a renewed opportunity to further rally people around distrust of foreigners, a central
theme for populists, one in some instances, that has been in the works for years.
2.2 Migration in Europe – A brief history
Prior to the end of the World War II, Europe was a significant source of
emigration to the rest of the world. It was not until after the war that the continent
gradually shifted to becoming a major destination for immigrants. Starting in the
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1950s in what became a crucial component of post-war economic reconstruction in
Western Europe, France, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK), recruited large
numbers of low-skilled workers. Though labor migration halted in response to the
economic crisis of the 1970s, immigration continued in the form of family
reunifications. Historical and political changes most notably the fall of the Iron
Curtain in 1989 and the war in the former Yugoslavia would also lead to increased
migration and asylum applications in many countries in Europe. Migration however
did not affect all European countries in the same way. Some states, mostly France and
the UK, who were former colonial powers, regulated and often facilitated the arrival
of immigrants from their former colonies. While other countries in the EU, like
Estonia and Slovakia have negligible migrant population.38
Starting in the early 1980s, in response to increased levels of migration, a rise
in anti-immigration populist parties alongside official efforts to integrate under the
EU, leaders began putting in place policies that would limit migration and asylum.
For William Hitchcock, immigration and asylum policies are inherently tied to the
process of European integration.39 Leaders recognized that a zone without internal
controls requires an effective system for managing external borders, common visa
policies and agreed rules on asylum and immigration. Harmonisation however has
tended to result in the adoption of the lowest common denominator of national
policies.40 With some exceptions, the result has been to push policy in a more
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restrictive direction. As Europe has worked to free up its internal borders to make
travel and trade easier within the EU, it has tried to make its external border more
secure. In 1999, EU states put in place the Common European Asylum System
(CEAS), which provided a common minimum standard for the treatment of all
asylum seekers and applications.41 The focus of the system however was on
harmonizing standards and procedures. Member states largely resisted centralizing
asylum policy, as it would have involved surrendering control of their external
borders, a policy area states have resisted surrendering sovereign responsibility over
to the union.42 As a result the application of the asylum principles proved uneven
across the EU, as they became subject to domestic preferences.43 Attempts to create
an effective burden-sharing policy were also met with stiff resistance.
Europe’s passport-free zone, the Schengen system, frequently hailed the
bloc’s most significant achievement, was thus accompanied by the strengthening of
the common external border against migrants and refugees.44 While external borders
remained under the authority of member states, internal borders were removed in
order to facilitate the movement of people, to speed the flow of commerce across
borders, to reduce costs and to boost economic activity. In response to increased
migratory pressures over the years, states have strengthened their control of their
external borders to make up for the loss in sovereignty created by the Schengen
system.45 The internal open borders policy was compensated with an exterior closed
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door policy. This approach has been criticized as amounting to the creation of a
“Fortress Europe,” a restricted, closed continent inhospitable, even hostile to nonWestern immigrants feeling war and economic privation.46 This has contributed to the
securitized approach to migrants, where the so-called irregular migration of non-EU
citizens is viewed as a threat to open borders, the EU state’s welfare system and other
benefits that are exclusive to the citizens of the bloc.
In the following chapter, I will explain how migration became a hot-button
political issue in Europe and how the public’s anxiety about the inflow of refugees
was tapped by right-wing populist parties who, using an anti-Islamic narrative,
painted refugees as a threat to people’s core concerns: cultural identity, personal
security and economic well-being. I will also address the increasing influence of
populist parties in Europe and the extent to which the refugee crisis increased their
popular appeal and led to policies that restricted or even denied entry to asylum
seekers. It made a unified EU response to a humanitarian crisis impossible,
notwithstanding Europe’s commitment to the principle of human rights and the
international treaties that underpin it. As for the far-right parties, the refugee crisis
proved to be a boon as they developed slogans, narrative and catchwords designed to
stir Europeans’ anxieties, which were already substantial given years of successful
anti-immigrant campaigning.
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Chapter 3: Europe’s Refugee Crisis
Amidst the lack of a unified EU policy on asylum and simmering popular
resentment towards immigrants, large numbers of people from predominantly Muslim
countries began landing on Europe’s shores, starting in 2011. Fleeing protracted
conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, thousands of men, women and children
began arriving by boats, which were often not seaworthy and even on foot, attempting
to enter Europe. Given their Mediterranean coastlines, Greece and Italy received the
bulk of arrivals. The EU law governing asylum is the Dublin Regulation, which
assigns responsibility for processing asylum application to the state of first entry. 47
That state is charged with providing protection to asylum seekers and processing their
applications in order to prevent asylum “shopping”, where applicants, given Europe’s
open borders, can move about the EU in search for the best asylum offer.48 A major
criticism of the Dublin Regulation is the absence of burden sharing provisions to
prevent EU border states, such as Greece and Italy, of being saddled with
disproportionate responsibility compared to the northern states. The principle of
solidarity among EU states, a founding principle, was meant to ensure collective
action based on the concept of shared values and responsibilities. All states,
especially the wealthier northern ones, were expected to admit their fair share of
asylum seekers.
But as thousands continued to pour into mainland Greece and the Greek
islands, the northern EU states offered little support. Aid groups who rushed to
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provide humanitarian assistance to the newly arriving refugees criticized European
governments for failing to process people quickly and effectively, and for corralling
them in makeshift tent camps or crowded facilities that offered limited access to
healthcare and basic sanitary standards. Trust began to erode among states as
countries like Germany, France and Sweden, states with large migrant populations
and a history of admitting refugees, were only willing to settle relatively limited
numbers of people. They also insisted that Greece continue to host the majority of
asylum seekers, prompting its Prime Minister, Alexis Tsipras to declare that Greece
had become a “giant holding pen.”49 Refugees were drawn to the more affluent
European states, especially Germany and Sweden, either because of family
connections or because they believed that these countries would be more hospitable
and offer better work opportunities. This logic was not lost on these two states, which
balked at having to take in a disproportionate number of migrants or at the principle
of allowing asylum seekers to decide where they would settle. In September 2015,
German Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere said refugees should not be able to
choose where to settle: “We can't allow [them] to freely choose where they want to
stay – that's not the case anywhere in the world.”50 One of the results of this was that
in Greece, asylum seekers were packed into an abandoned former airport terminal in
Athens, crammed into an indoor stadium or slept rough in the city’s central squares.51
EU members accused Greece of not registering new arrivals properly and allowing
them to travel north.
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3.1 Sea Rescues
Though Europe did not lack the economic, social and political capability, it
largely failed to put in a place a coherent response to migrant arrivals, long before a
crisis arose. A cooperative policy on managing the flows of people would have
avoided the chaos that gave rise to the notion of people storming borders and shores
by the thousands and of governments lacking the capabilities to deal with them. From
a humanitarian perspective, most of the asylum seekers originated from the top ten
migrant producing countries52 and thus were entitled to protection under international
law.53 Instead, Europeans regarded asylum seekers with suspicion, referring to them
as imposters, irregulars, illegals and economically-motivate migrants. In the absence
of legal and safe channels to access asylum, desperate refugees often paid hefty sums
to people smugglers who would then force them onto unseaworthy and overcrowded
rubber boats for their journey. These vessels would often capsize during stormy
weather or smugglers would deliberately sabotage them, in order to prompt a nearby
ship to rescue them. Deaths at sea became frequent, but states were hesitant to
respond even in the face of widely publicized human tragedy.
Though drownings at sea became common as early as 2011, no coherent
policies were put in place until October 2013, when more than 360 migrants died after
their boat sank near the Italian island of Lampedusa, causing international outrage.
The Italian government of then-prime minister Enrico Letta established Mare
Nostrum, a robust search-and-rescue naval operation. Supported by a budget of $12
52
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million a month, large navy vessels rescued people just outside Libyan waters. The
operation, financed entirely by the Italian government, may have saved at least
130,000 lives.54 But a year later the Italian government shut down Mare Nostrum,
citing that it would not be able to shoulder the cost alone, to little objection by EU
states. Not only did other EU states refuse to help fund the program, they alleged that
it was counterproductive. The UK government argued that sea rescues served as a
“pull factor,” encouraging more migrants to attempt the sea crossing55 – effectively
saying that letting migrants drown would discourage others from making the perilous
voyage. Sea rescues also proved contentious in Italy. Maurizio Gasparri, a member of
the Senate and of the center-right Forza Italia party claimed that Mare Nostrum had
become a “taxi service” for migrants.56 An opinion poll showed that a third of Italians
believed that migrants should be abandoned at sea.57
Mare Nostrum was replaced by an EU border control mission named Triton,
which rights groups pointed out, would lead to more deaths at sea because it had a
smaller budget and lacked a search-and-rescue mandate, charged instead with
patrolling and policing the waters. It had fewer ships and a smaller area of operation
that remained close to the Italian coast – far from where most of the shipwrecks
happen. Still, the refugees kept coming. The year 2014 recorded the highest number
of migrants trying to reach Europe, the International Organization on Migration said
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in a report. By September of that year, it also recorded the highest number of
fatalities, with 3,279 deaths.58 In two separate incidents in September 2014, at least
700 migrants drowned. In the worst incident, 500 migrants were believed to have died
after traffickers deliberately rammed and sunk their boat off the coast of Malta,
reportedly after an altercation with people on board.59 The year 2015 would prove
even deadlier: 3,784 refugees died while attempting to cross waters to reach European
shores. On 19 April 2015 the deadliest known shipwreck involving migrants
occurred: over 900 men, women and children drowned after their boat sank off the
coast of Libya. European leaders introduced the term migrant crisis after the incident.
The shipwreck, which had sent shockwaves around the world, also drew criticism of
the decision to scale back rescue operations as it had led to a rise in migrant deaths
without reducing their numbers. In response, EU leaders met in an emergency session
and proposed doubling the size of the EU search and rescue operation, but the result
was an operation that was still smaller and less well funded operation than Mare
Nostrum.60 Consequently, 5,098 migrants died at sea in 2016—an all time record.61
Why did the EU fail to put in place legal and safe pathways for people to seek
asylum in Europe? And why was the rescue of migrants at sea a politically charged
topic? The reasons lie squarely in the anti-immigrant sentiment advanced up by
populist right wing parties.
Populist leaders like Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders and Nigel Farage all
launched aggressive campaigns denouncing mainstream parties’ inadequate responses
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to the refugee crisis and suggested that these parties would admit large numbers of
refugees, to detrimental consequences. They also campaigned against the refugees. In
2015 Le Pen said migrants bring filth, crime, poverty and Islamic terrorism. In
response to the picture of Aylan Kurdi, a 3 year-old Syrian Kurdish boy whose
lifeless body washed up Turkey’s shore after the migrant boat he was on capsized,
drowning his mother and brother, Le Pen suggested it was simply a ploy to
manipulate European feelings of guilt. France is about to be “submerged” in a
“terrifying” wave of migrants who represent only a “burden” she said.62
Echoing a similar message, UKIP leader Nigel Farage said, “actually, most
people that are coming from those countries, whether they’re coming into Europe or
coming to America are basically economic migrants. “And it’s mixed in with some of
those that you potentially get terrorists. I do think the word refugee gets misused.”63
Nigel’s UKIP party stunned in 2014 election winning nearly 27 percent of the vote,
up from 16 percent in 2009.64 The leader of the Dutch Freedom Party, Geert Wilders,
went even further calling the flow of refugees an “Islamic invasion.”65 “Masses of
young men in their twenties with beards singing Allahu Akbar across Europe. It’s an
invasion that threatens our prosperity, our security, our culture and identity,” he said.
“We have to close our borders for all asylum seekers and all immigrants from Islamic
countries.”

62

Read: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/world/europe/for-marine-le-pen-migration-is-a-readymade-issue.html
63
Read: http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/766598/nigel-farage-fox-news-claims-refugeeseconomic-migrants
64
Find more stats: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-uk2009.html
65
Read: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-netherlands-idUSKCN0RA0WY20150910

29

Citizens picked up on these anti-immigrant messages and thousands took to
the streets to protest in major cities in France, Britain, Germany, Austria, the
Netherlands, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia demanding an end to the
resettlement of refugees.66 Though there were sizeable counter protests in support of
refugees, they were vastly outnumbered by those calling for closing the borders.
But how do statements and messages advanced by populist leaders that paint
migrants as dangerous, and a threat to the economy, jobs and popular culture lead to
policy changes? In the next section I will show how these messages not only affect
public opinion, but also mainstream leaders who co-opt their ideas in an effort to hold
on to their legitimacy and position in power.
3.2 Populism in Europe
Populism was absent from European politics during the first decades of the
post World War II period, as it had strong connections with the xenophobia and
violence of the war and reminiscent of Nazism and Fascism.67 Starting in the late
1980s, however, xenophobia made a comeback. Several populist parties became
strong political forces as a nationalist backlash began against the speed and the extent
of EU integration, ignited by public fear that national sovereignty would be eroded. It
was also a response to a marked rise in immigration.68 The Front National (FN) was
the first to post an electoral success when it won 9.9 percent of the votes in the 1986
French parliamentary election. In 1990 the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) led by
Jörg Haider won 16.6 percent in the parliamentary elections. In Switzerland, the
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Automobile Party won 10 seats in Parliament in 1991. In Belgium, the Vlaam Blok, a
Flemish regionalist party won 12 seats that same year. The Swedish Democrats won
6.8 percent of the vote in 1991 and 25 parliamentary seats. The Danish Progress Party
won 9 percent of the vote in 1988 general election, while the Norwegian Progress
party became the country’s third largest party with 13 percent of the vote in 1989.
Though founded in different times, under different circumstances and with different
ideologies – all populist parties in Europe devote high salience to immigration policy.
They have successfully politicised immigration and have called for limiting and even
reversing the number of foreigners in their country.
Electoral studies have focused primarily on the “demand side,” on the ideal
breeding ground for populism and emphasized such catalysts as economic crises or
increases in migration. Yet the “supply” side, the leaders and parties, have received
less attention. In this thesis, I argue that fertile ground is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for the rise of populist right wing parties.69 I focus on the populist leaders
themselves who deftly cultivate economic and social circumstances around them in
order to advance their agenda. A fertile ground thus does not automatically lead to
populism. Instead, right wing populism is the result of the deliberate work of right
wing populist leaders who create and develop a narrative of a majority population that
is afraid and whose identity and personal safety is threatened by mass migration.70
This narrative, which presents itself as common sense, has been met with widespread
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approval. In this thesis, I will carefully describe and analyze this constructed
narrative.
Since the 1980s, as a result of the arrival of labor migrants, family unifications
and refugees from various parts of the world, European societies have become
multicultural.71 The populist right began to translate this change as a threat to
European identity and to its welfare system. For Müller, opposition to migration is
due to the fact that populism is by definition an exclusionary form of politics that
creates a distinct identity of “the people.”72 For a political party or movement to be
populist, it must identify a part of the people as the real people.73 Excluded are
minority groups, immigrants and “illegal migrants.” Populism creates a distinct us
versus them. In Europe the people are the majority white “native” Christian citizens
of Europe. Minorities, notably migrants and refugees, constitute the other. Not only is
the people one homogenous group, “them” are also one monolithic camp. For Cas
Mudde, populism in Europe relies on nativism, which demands for states to be
inhabited exclusively by members of the native group, the people and non-natives
fundamentally threaten the homogeneity of the nation state.74 Thus the xenophobic
element in European populism derives from a very specific conception of the nation,
which relies on a religious, cultural and some instances an ethnic definition of the
people.
The political science literature on immigration tells us very little about the
origins of xenophobia. Instead, it supposes that this sentiment is almost a natural
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outcome produced by immigrants’ characteristics, which differ greatly from that of
the majority population. Under this conception difference inevitably leads to tensions,
fear and a loss of cultural identity among host citizens.75 I take on the immigration
studies insight, which explains xenophobia as a social and political construction. It
has a dialectical relationship between the self and the other, premised on the negative
conception of the other. Xenophobia is therefore not a social phenomenon or a
consequence of the cultural difference between immigrants and host citizens. Instead,
it is the result of a deliberate framing of foreigners and immigrants by political
leaders that stresses on an us versus them distinction and agitates fear, a loss of
control and identity in the face of the arrival of the other. The intensity or the degree
of negative sentiment held by a population depends on the charisma and the ability of
these parties and movements to sell their narrative.
3.3 On Identity
Right wing populists have framed the question of migration as a threat to main
culture, values and identity, creating social problem and a crisis that must be dealt
with on the national policy level. This has allowed these parties to present themselves
as defenders of national identities and the larger European identity.76 For Slavoj
Zizek, immigration is always articulated as a driver of tensions between people who
are supposedly different. “What is at stake in ethnic tensions is always the possession
of the national thing. The ‘other’ wants to steal our enjoyment by ruining our ‘way of
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life’.”77 Populists’ central argument is that their political mobilization against
migration is part of a larger fight for the preservation and defense of European
identity. Identity on the one hand signifies belonging to a certain place or people. On
the other, it requires difference. “We cannot know who we are unless we know who
we are not.”78
The most effective tactic has been the introduction of a zero sum dynamic of
both material resources and European identity. This involves the notion that there is
an ongoing competition for material prosperity and cultural self-determination
between European natives and perceived outsiders, and that what one group gains the
other loses. This stance assumes that prosperity and identity are finite resources that
the majority group should have privileged access to. Sharing them leads to a
disintegration of values and resources and a risk of losing them altogether. National
society should be aggressively protected, the flow of migrants must be stopped or
reversed and integration must become more rigid and forceful.79 Populists also play
on fear: fear of losing the self, majority culture and identity. Fear thus plays an
important role in homogenizing the in-group and polarizing the relationship towards
the out-group.
The European sense of identity and conception of difference emerge most
clearly at the continent’s borders and in its encounters with those defined as nonEuropean. Given that the physical borders of the EU have changed over the decades
incorporating more states, the definition of who is in Europe and who is out has been
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less clear. What does it mean to be European? For the average European citizen, there
are two Europes, one cultural and the other political. Cultural Europe is a broad
concept rooted historically and culturally in Christianity. Political Europe refers to the
EU as a bureaucratic system, which affords citizens legal rights and responsibilities.
The boundaries of cultural and political Europe however increasingly overlap, leading
inevitably to tensions between the two concepts. This became visible in the debates
about Turkey joining the EU. Those in favor of Turkish membership defined the EU
in largely political terms as a post-nationalist and constitutional entity. As long as
Turkey implements human rights, democratic rule and market economy there cannot
be principled objections against its EU membership. In contrast, many opponents
invoked cultural visions of a Europe as a distinct civilization united by Christianity.
As a result, a predominantly Muslim country could never qualify for EU membership,
no matter how secular its political system.80
3.4 Migrants and Islam
Populism’s antagonism against migrants has evolved over the years. Who is
defined as a foreigner in the first place has evolved as well as have the negative
messages associated with migration. In recent years, much of the anti-immigration
rhetoric has been directed against Muslims and their religion, Islam, which is
presented as a threat to western way of life. Muslims are not, however, the first
minority group to be targeted by populists. For Ruth Wodak, some patterns of antiSemitic prejudices in Europe have been repurposed and applied to other ethnic
groups, mostly Muslims but also the Roma. The populist right has also sharpened and
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modified their messages to align with contemporary issues. Today, they have a wide
repertoire of anti-Muslim ideas and arguments in the context of an overarching
hypernationalist anti-immigration narrative that singles out Islam as the new
existential other of European identity.81 I argue that to the populist right, the other can
be contextualized and replaced, and what matters is having and maintaining a group
of people who are defined as such.
Islam is the religion of most migrants in Europe. The established migrant
population came from Turkey, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and North Africa
starting in the 1950s, in contrast to the more recent arrivals since 2011 from Syria,
Iraq and Afghanistan. In total, there are now over 13 million Muslims living in the
EU.82 As the largest and most obvious minority group, Muslims have in recent years
been singled out as the other in relation to native European citizens. The populist right
treats Muslims in Europe as a singular, undifferentiated group whose members are all
the same, denying that they have arrived in different times, come from different
countries, under different circumstance and have differing levels attachment to their
religion. An anti-Islam that targets all Muslims has become a major part of the
rhetoric of most populist leaders, as witness for example by the 2017 main campaign
slogan of Dutch leader Geert Wilders, STOP ISLAM.83 He along with others, have
successfully introduced the debate of whether Muslim immigrants ought to be
admitted to Europe in the first place and whether the Muslim population, painted as
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all being religious fanatics, can or should be accorded a permanent place in Western
society. The debate, which has created a great deal of animosity and has offended
Muslims from all walks of life, has given right wing parties significant publicity that
has gained them voters as a large segment of public opinion has identified with their
message. This in turn has given the populist right the opportunity to further mobilize
people on the issue.
In Italy, Greece and Poland, more than half of respondents in a 2014 poll
reported having negative attitudes towards Muslims.84 A 2016 poll by the Ipsos Mori
research group found that many people in the EU grossly over-estimate the size of the
Muslim population in their countries. In France the average over-estimation was 31
percent, whereas the actual figure is 7.5 percent. 85 Germans, Italians and Belgians
likewise overestimated the size of the Muslim population in their country. The same
poll found that most citizens also overestimate the growth of Muslim populations.
The average estimation in France was that by 2020, 40 percent of the population
would be Muslim, when the actual projection is 8.3 percent. Italy, Belgium and
Germany also grossly overestimated the growth of the Muslim population and had an
inflated view of the proportion of the national population that would be accounted for
by Muslims.
This exaggerated perception of the Muslim population’s size and a
preoccupation with their fertility rates can be traced back to the discourse advanced
by populist leaders. Unlike policies on economy or trade, which are complicated and
have little perceptible effect on the lives of regular citizens, migration has direct and
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obvious effects on the daily lives of citizens. It involves working alongside foreign
individuals, sharing public institutions, public parks and neighborhoods with them. It
means living alongside Muslims, who are perceived as acting differently, the more so
because they speak a different language and adhere to different customs and
sometimes even dress differently. Populist leaders pick up on these differences and
translate them into a problem, a threat even a crisis that must be acted upon
immediately with drastic measures. Rejecting accusations of racism, they reference
differences and incompatibility in religion, cultural backgrounds, values and identity.
Pointing out the differences between Muslims and majority culture in Europe serve as
a justification for the radical right wing’s policies of exclusion. These parties and
movements emphasize Europe’s supposed homogeneity and of the importance of
preserving it amidst the threat of what they present as contamination. They paint
Muslims as people radically different from Europeans—as backward, lazy and
inimical to modernity and democracy. Natives by contract are pure, innocent and
hardworking people who are faced with Muslim migrants who want to “Islamize”
and take over Europe by building many more mosques, minarets and halal butcher
shops. Their sheer growing presence will be exemplified through the increase of
women donning headscarves, speaking another language, practicing a different
culture and simply looking “different.” For the populist right, Muslim citizens can
never belong to Europe, no matter how many years or generations they have lived
there, as their religion disqualifies them.
Populist leaders present themselves as the lone defenders of the authentic
Europe that supposedly existed before the advent of Muslim migrants. They claim to
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be able to take their nations back to the halcyon era when they where inhabited
exclusively by people wedded to a common culture. In addition to propagating this
myth, they purport to defend liberal values and secular law.86 Stressing the supposed
homogeneity of the majority group, many populist parties also take on a distinct
authoritarian dimension, arguing that immigrants must either follow local rules or
“get out of the country.”87 But for the nativist right, Muslim immigrations lack both
the ability and the willingness to assimilate because Islam itself is entirely
incompatible with the principles of Western civilization.88 Muslims are not only
incapable and unwilling to assimilate; their very presence poses a treat to western
values and culture, which renders efforts to integrate Muslim migrants not only futile
but also dangerous.
Populists promote the idea that Islam is not solely a religion but also a
totalitarian ideology that is at odds with western liberal way of life. Some have gone
so far as to compare Islam to Nazism. Wilders, for instance, called for banning the
Quran on the grounds that like Hitler’s Mein Kampf, it is the source of a fascist
ideology that incites death and destruction. And that it wants to kill everything they
stand for in a modern western democracy.89 Wilders thus charges that he is not racist,
rather it is Muslims who are intolerant. Over the years, the nativist right has advanced
numerous ideas, demands and policy proposals that would impede and ultimately
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reverse the integration of Muslims in Western European society. The intent of these
initiatives has been to render Muslims and Islam itself invisible.90
3.5 Securitization and 9/11
The September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, followed by the 2004
Madrid train bombings added a securitization element to policies on asylum in
general, and to Muslim migrants and migration from Muslim countries in particular.91
The Paris attacks in 2015, Brussels suicide bombings, Nice truck attack and Berlin
Christmas markets attack in 2016 perpetrated by Muslims in the name of the Islamic
State, have all strengthened support for the right wing populists who were quick to
capitalize on the attacks as proof of the need to keep out Muslims refugees and to
restrict the freedom of Muslim population in Europe. But though the populist right
has been a strong supporter of strict anti-terrorism legislation even before 9/11, the
post-9/11 securitization of politics in Europe was broadly supported within the
political mainstream and therefore did not require their approval. Right wing
populists however seized on the fear of terrorism to make the case that Islam is itself
a violent religion and that every Muslim citizen of Europe or asylum seeker is
therefore a potential terrorist.92 By creating a deep suspicion of Muslims as a group,
the populists advanced the idea that as a religion and an ideology, Islam must be
eradicated in Europe.
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3.6 Bans on Burqas, Minarets and Headscarves
The anti-Islamic policies espoused by populists are not simply rhetoric or an
electoral strategy. They have led to government policies that have targeted the
freedoms of Muslims in Europe. The most recent case was March 17, 2017, when the
Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that companies could ban staff from wearing Islamic
headscarves and other visible religious symbols.93 The case involved a Belgian firm
that had dismissed a Muslim receptionist for wearing a headscarf. In its ruling, the
ECJ found that company regulations banning political, philosophical or religious
signs did not constitute direct discrimination so long as such prohibitions applied to
religious garb from all faiths such as Sikh turbans and Jewish skullcaps.94 In
Germany, the AfD party welcomed the ruling. “The ECJ’s ruling sends out the right
signal, especially for Germany,” the party’s Berlin leader Georg Pazderski said. “Of
course companies have to be allowed to ban the wearing of headscarves,” 95 he added.
Restrictions on Muslim women’s headdress have been a subject of intense
debate in Europe for a long time. Back in 1989, two Muslim female students in
France were suspended from their public middle school for refusing to remove their
headscarves, sparking a controversy on freedom of religion, expression and the
French principle of secularism. In 2004, France passed a law that banned all religious
symbols from official state institutions. Though the law applied to all symbols such as
Christian crosses and Jewish skullcaps, it was largely regarded as specifically
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targeting Muslim women’s’ headscarves.96 The ruling led to many EU countries to
follow suit with similar legislation that rights groups have said violate religious
freedom.97
In 2009, a majority of Swiss citizens voted in favor of a referendum promoted
by the far right SVP party to ban the construction of minarets in the country. 98 The
success of the vote was largely due to the campaign that aggressively promoted the
idea that the presence of Muslims personified by the minarets of mosques, poses an
imminent threat to Swiss national culture and values. This narrative resonated
strongly with average citizens, as 57.5 percent voted in favor of the proposal.
Campaign posters depicted a Swiss flag with sprouting black, missile-shaped minarets
and a woman donning a niqab, a full-face veil that showed only her eyes. Oskar
Freysiger, a member of the SVP party and a parliamentarian, said that minarets were
a “symbol of a political and aggressive Islam. The minute you have minarets in
Europe it means that Islam will have taken over.” 99
In 2010, France and Belgium voted in favor of nationwide restrictions on
wearing the burqa in public places. France was the first country to ban the full-face
veil in public spaces in April 2011. The penalty for the offense is $205 and being
forced by the court to take a class on French values.100 Belgium followed suit making
it an offense punishable by a $197 fine or up to seven days in jail.101 The bill was
passed almost unanimously in the Belgian parliament, with lawmakers citing security
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reasons for the ban, and claiming the veil is a tool of oppression.102 The European
Court of Human Rights upheld the bans in 2014, rejecting arguments that outlawing
full-face veils breached religious freedom. 103
Taken together, these measures demonstrate the far right’s success in
mobilizing public opinion against Muslim symbols in Europe and the extent of its
political clout. They were successful even when they did not do well in election,
making their achievement all the more remarkable. It also provides insights into
majority opinion on Islam in Europe and the legalization of public restrictions on
Islamic spaces and symbols of faith in an otherwise liberal Europe. This shows that
these restrictions are no longer peculiar to far right movements and are being
endorsed by mainstream ideologies.104
3.7 “Mainstreaming”
For Aristotle Kallis, extreme ideas against Muslims have a life cycle, from
politically and socially marginal to established mainstream recognition.105 Though the
mainstreaming is gradual, it is also powerful and infectious, revealing the
vulnerability of average citizens to negative messages. According to Kallis, right
wing populism taps into a concealed social demand for policies that suppress minority
groups. This demand is very receptive to external confirmation “nudges” that can
activate and even further radicalize people. A successful message not only reinforces
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similar preexisting stereotypes, it liberates them from the notion that such ideas are
taboo and therefore not part of public conversation.106
Kallis suggests that relying on the electoral support of the populist right alone
as a measure of their success obscures how their ideas have succeeded in shaping a
new, broader and social common sense that is accepted by a wider population.107
Looking at the election results of the 2007 French elections for instance, which I will
analyze at length in my case study on France, awarded Jean Marie Le Pen 10 percent
of the vote in the first round of elections and was hailed as ushering in a decline of the
FN party. Yet a significant proportion of voters who abandoned the FN in 2007 were
attracted by the anti-immigration rhetoric of Nicolas Sarkozy who successfully
mainstreamed FN’s ideas, which were previously considered radical. A central aim of
this thesis is to highlight how mainstream leaders’ alleged desire to address the
relevant concerns of the people, or their concern over losing voters produces a winwin scenario for far-right populist parties: either they succeed in the election by
winning a large margin ushering them and their ideas into the mainstream, or,
mainstream parties will emulate their policies. In either case, their ideas succeed.
For João Carvalho, mainstream parties pick up policy ideas on migration that
were advanced by the populist right and gained traction through a political process he
terms, “co-option,”108 the incorporation of policy proposals of challenger groups so as
to undercut their appeal and increase the non-populists parties’ electoral prospects.
Established parties adopt populist proposals in order to enhance their position and
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recapture voters lost to opposition parties. Gianpietro Mazzoleni speaks of the
“populist contamination” of mainstream political discourse. His argument is not that
all political parties in Europe have essentially become populist parties, but that most
parties use populist themes in their political platforms.109 Carvalho sees co-option as a
reflection of right wing parties’ influence in domestic politics. Influence should
therefore be understood as the ability to promote a particular outcome rather than
electoral support. Co-option is also a strategy employed by mainstream parties to
neutralize challengers. Mainstream parties that embrace stricter migration procedures
often gain back support lost to populists, but at the expense of the rights of minority
migrant populations and of asylum seekers.
There are many examples. In January 2017, a few weeks before their national
elections, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte of the liberal People’s party for Freedom
and Democracy (PVV), published an open letter in the Dutch newspapers targeted at
immigrants. He said anyone who cannot respect customs should simply leave. Those
who “refuse to adapt and criticize our values” should “behave normally, or go
away,”110 Rutte said in the full-page newspaper.111 He said the Dutch were
increasingly uncomfortable with those who abused the freedoms they enjoyed after
coming to the Netherlands, who “harass gays, or whistle at women in short skirts, or
brand ordinary Dutch people as racists.” He added that the solution was “not to paint
everyone with the same brush, or insult or expel whole groups” but to “make it crystal
clear what is normal, and what is not normal in our country. We must actively defend
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our values.” Wilders shot back saying that the prime minister is weak and accused
him of being a “copy cat” – imitating his policies on national identity and migration.
Though establishment parties copying of populist proposals could limit their electoral
losses or even make electoral gains, the effects are variable and could lead to favoring
the right.112 Copying often also legitimizes the themes of the populist right and
increases their influence.
On March 15, 2017, Rutte’s party won with 21 percent of the vote. “It is an
evening in which the Netherlands after Brexit, after the American elections said stop
to the wrong kind of populism,”113 said in his victory speech. Wilders’ PVV party
won 13 percent and a third more seats than in the last election, becoming the second
largest party in the Netherlands. “We were the third largest party of the Netherlands.
Now we are the second largest party. Next time we will be number one,” Wilders
defiantly said. Though pro-EU leaders hailed Rutte’s victory as a win for mainstream
parties, observers note that Rutte only won after accommodating Wilders’ ideas on
migration. Ten years ago, Wilders was largely regarded as a raging, fear mongering
extremist whose proposals to ban the construction of new mosques in the
Netherlands, were ridiculous. Today, not only has he himself succeeded in stepping
into the mainstream, his ideas have become the law of the land, embraced by the
ruling party.
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Chapter 4: Case Study Germany
Although the emergence of populism in Europe coincides with the arrival of
migrants in the postwar period, it was hardly the case that migration, even sudden,
necessarily produced populism. Instead, populists advance their authoritarian and
nativist political agenda by claiming that the presence of migrants could lead to job
losses among the citizens of receiving countries as well as a loss of cultural and
national identity. Some of the literature on populist parties and movements points to
economic crises and high unemployment rates as reasons behind rising support for
them. But the economic argument alone fails to explain the rise in Germany of a
hostile attitude towards foreigners, especially given that Germany has had over the
decades relatively low unemployment rates and a faster growing economy than that of
its neighbors.114 It would thus be misleading to reduce populism to migration-driven
economic anxieties and ignore the more emotive element of identity politics.
When the Federal Republic of Germany was established in 1949, most
Germans sought to break with their Nazi past. Because of the legacy of the Third
Reich, nascent right wing populist parties have been stigmatised and linked in the
public mind with an ideology that brought death and horror to millions of
Europeans.115 Yet certain political attitudes from that period continue to linger and
large segments of the German population have proven to be susceptible to various
racist appeals.116 Starting in 1964, some 40 right wing parties have formed in
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Germany. In 1989, the Republikaner Party (REP) entered the Berlin parliament with
7.5 percent of the vote, 117 becoming the first right wing populist party to clear the
hurdle that required parties to get the 5 percent of the vote at minimum to gain seats
in the Bundestag.118 REP, which called for stopping all Muslim migration into
Germany, argued that Muslims were opposed to democracy, were militant and
murderous against non-Islamic believers. At the time, there were 2.4 million Muslims
in Germany, representing 3 percent of the German population.119 Despite the
relatively small population, REP leaders promoted the idea that Muslims were
working towards establishing an Islamic society in Germany and their presence is a
biological, social and cultural threat to Germany.120 By the early 1990s REP lost
momentum and popularity amid scandals, tactical mistakes and anti-Semitic remarks
involving party leaders, which did not resonate well with voters, leading to a sharp
decline in their support.121
4.1 Immigration to Germany
The migration of Muslims in Germany dates back to the1960s. Faced with
labor shortages in the country’s post-war rebuilding efforts, Germany began
recruiting foreign workers on a large scale. Faced with acute labor shortages and
declining birth rates, Germany recruited Gastarbeiter, guest workers from southern
Europe but also from Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia, three predominantly Muslim
countries. Foreign labor became a major resource for the reconstruction of the
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country’s infrastructure. But recruitment ended in 1973 in response to the oil crisis
and the ensuing economic recession. Though many workers returned home, a
significant number chose to stay and benefitted from a family reunification provision
in the law that allowed immigrants to be joined by family members, including wives
and children. The foreign presence in Germany was thus transformed from temporary
single male workers living in allocated housing, to that of foreign families who attend
schools, bought homes, opened businesses and used public institutions. Today,
Germany is home to 4.7 million Muslims122 and has the largest Muslim population in
Europe. They make up almost 6 percent of the population.
The German but also in the Austrian discussion on race, integration and
migration, has had an emphasis on the alleged biological differences between natives
and foreigners. This outlook is rooted in Nazi ideology, which stressed the alleged
genetic and racial superiority of the Aryan race. Some populist leaders have advanced
similar theories that migrants, Muslims specifically, are inferior beings for reasons
rooted in their nature. These parties have portrayed Muslims as not only unwilling to
integrate, but incapable of it because of insurmountable cultural and religious
differences imbedded in their genes.123 This claim, apart from being scientifically
unfounded and reminiscent of a dark period in German history, has been put forward
by some populist parties as backed by science, and thus factual, even objective.
4.2 Sarrazin controversy
A controversy in 2010 demonstrated how in Germany the irrational
preoccupation with race and racial disparities between people remains prevalent
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among politicians and average Germans. Former state finance minister of Berlin and
member of the Social Democrat Party (SDP) Thilo Sarrazin released a book in which
he argued that Muslims undermine German society, sponge off the state and could
swamp the country due to their higher birth rate.124 The book warned that Muslim
immigrants, who Sarrazin claimed are less intelligent than native Germans, were
destroying the country’s identity. According to the book, Muslims are unwilling and
incapable of integrating into the mainstream because of their genetics. The book
entitled Deutschland schafft sich ab (Germany does away with itself) sold 1.5 million
copies and became the most successful non-fictional book in post-war-German
history. “I don't need to accept anyone who lives off the state, rejects this country...
and is always producing little girls with headscarves. This is true of 70 percent of the
Turkish and 90 percent of the Arab population of Berlin,” he said in an interview.125
Though the book appalled many people, an online poll by the Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger
daily taken during the ensuing controversy, showed that a third of all respondents
supported Sarrazin’s claims. A further 43 percent found his words “exaggerated in
some cases but believed that he was right about many things.” Another survey in Die
Welt showed that over two-thirds felt criticism of Sarrazin was unjustified.126
The chairman of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), of which Sarrazin was a
member, initially supported an attempt to expel him but backtracked when it became
clear that a large proportion of SPD members sympathized with his arguments. Just a
few weeks after announcing that Sarrazin’s denigration of Muslims was “completely
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unhelpful,” 127 German Chancellor Angela Merkel also backtracked. In a speech to the
youth members of her Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party, she declared that
Germany's attempt to create a multicultural society had “utterly failed.”128 “We lied to
ourselves for a while saying that they [foreign workers] won’t stay, and they will
disappear again one day. This is not the reality,” she said. “This multicultural
approach, saying that we simply live side-by-side and are happy about each other,”
she added... has failed, utterly failed.”129
4.3 Multiculturalism
Multikulti or multiculturalism is much talked about in Germany and is also a
focus of heated debates on the merits and dangers of integrating foreigners into
German society. Introduced in the 1980s by Christian officials, the term was seized
by populist leaders not as an expression of tolerance, but as evidence of German
resignation to the threat posed to their national identity by foreign immigration.130
Multiculturalism in this context means the unwillingness of foreigners to ingrate into
German society and the failure of officials to devise and to enforce stricter rules that
would oblige them to integrate. The definition of integration remains up for debate in
Germany as well as in other parts of Europe. Populist parties in Germany have not
offered a more concrete definition but have specifically pointed to the exercise of
Islamic cultural and religious practices as signs that immigrants are not integrated.
The AfD says that it ought to involve “more than just learning German.” Populist
parties instead envisage multiculturalism’s negation, homogeneity as a utopia of the
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pure nation-state. The essence of internal homogenization is captured in the infamous
slogan of German right-wing extremists: Germany for the German’s, foreigners out!
Not only should the people of our nation rule our states, we should be its exclusive
inhabitants.131 Like mainstream leaders in France, instead of challenging such ideas,
German establishment politicians have embraced the extreme right wing definitions
of identity and belonging, and adopted policy proposals that have limited the
freedoms of minority populations and have kept migrants out.
4.4 Refugee Crisis
In September 2015, at the height of the refugee crisis, and as EU states
struggled to agree to a mechanism to distribute 160,000 Syrian refugees from Italy
and Greece across the 28 member bloc, Germany announced it would open its doors
to asylum seekers and refused to put a ceiling on the number of refugees it would
accept. “We can do this,” Merkel famously said. “These people must be given a home
free of fear and terror,” she said. 132 Over the next several months, Germany received
some 1.1 million applications for asylum. Despite some initial enthusiasm from
residents and international leaders, by December 2015, Merkel began to face a
backlash, not least from her own party coalition. Horst Seehofer, head of the
conservative Christian Social Union the CDU’s counterpart in Bavaria, a
predominantly Catholic province, balked, chiefly because more than half a million
Muslim asylum seekers had entered Germany through Bavaria. 133 He demanded the
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creation of transit zones.134 She also faced resistance from the left, the Social
Democratic Party's Sigmar Gabriel, her vice chancellor who denounced the creation
of such zones as “detention centers.”135 The back and forth political wrangling
created much uncertainty in Germany and a loss of trust in Merkel’s ability to
effectively deal with the situation.
What prompted Merkel at the height of the refugee crisis to make such a
decision? Though admirable from a humanitarian perspective, it was certain to have
major political implications at home where anti-immigrant sentiment was high among
people and among European state leaders who had shown great reluctance to
cooperate under the EU on the issue. Observers have noted that Merkel’s motivation
has little to do with generosity or humanitarianism. Accepting the educated middle
class refugees, like many of the displaced Syrians arriving in Germany, could be an
economic self-interest amid rapidly declining birth rates136 and acute labor
shortages.137 But more importantly, Merkel had intended to show leadership, in the
context of continuing to maintain the image of Germany as the leading power on the
big issues facing the EU, boosting her own position regionally and internationally.
She had thus hoped that European leaders would follow her lead by taking in more
refugees, which would ultimately help resolve the crisis. Merkel thus had no intention
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of solving the entirety of the crisis alone nor did she foresee such strong
condemnations from all sides.
According to a best selling political non-fiction book released in April 2017,
entitled Die Getriebenen (The Driven Ones), Merkel’s decision to keep open German
borders was neither the result of rational planning nor moral righteousness, but
“tactical blundering and communication failures.”138 The author, Robin Alexander
suggests that Merkel had avoided taking a major decision on the refugee crisis since it
erupted in 2011, considering it a political minefield for a conservative leader like her.
But in September 2015, emboldened by polls that indicated that she had strong public
support on her side and refugees as a top concern for Germans, she decided to keep
the borders open. This proved to be a near fatal error as by September 2016 Merkel
faced 45 percent approval rating, one of her lowest on record.139
4.5 Alternative for Germany party
The controversy over migration created a favorable political context for far
right populist parties. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, which was created in
2013 as a protest movement against bailouts for indebted EU member states like
Greece, jumped on the opportunity. The party had only won 4.7 percent of the vote in
the September 2013 federal election while campaigning against Merkel’s policy on
the Euro Crisis, missing the 5 percent threshold for representation in the
parliament.140 By 2015, the party faced few prospects as Germany’s economy
escaped virtually unscathed from the crisis and other European economies were
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recovering, albeit slowly. The AfD decided to take on a new theme, the next big issue
facing Europe and made it central to its platform: the refugee crisis. The AfD almost
exclusively began campaigning on an anti-immigration nationalist platform that is
specifically opposed to Islam. That year the party’s co founder Bernd Lucke
announced that he would step down out of concern that the party had become
increasingly Islamophobic and xenophobic.141 The party nonetheless swept 22 percent
of the vote in the 2016 local elections, pushing Merkel’s party to third place and
defeating it in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Merkel’s home state. This caused
shockwaves within Merkel’s party as well as in other establishment parties. “This
isn’t pretty for us,” said Michael Grosse-Broemer, one of Merkel's top deputies in
parliament in Berlin in an interview. AfD co-leader Frauke Petry was quick to
pounce, “those who voted for the AfD were sending a message of protest, ”142 she
said. “This is a slap in the face for Merkel – not only in Berlin but also in her home
state. The voters made a clear statement against Merkel’s disastrous immigration
policies. This put her in her place,” she added.
As the AfD’s popularity continued to surge, Petry was emboldened to take on
more extremist views. In January 2016 she said that in the face of the recent influx of
refugees, the police might have to shoot people crossing the border illegally. “Police
must stop refugees entering German soil”, she said. 143 The AfD’s website listed
asylum and immigration, Islam and identity as the top two out of its five focus
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issues.144 The party has also sought to emulate the FN as an example of a powerful
party with a history of successes. According to the AfD’s program issued in 2016,
“the ideology of multiculturalism is a serious threat to the social peace and the
continuity of the national and cultural unity of the state” and “Islam is not part of
Germany.”145 The program further describes that Islamic religious practices and
procedures are at odds with Germany’s liberal and democratic constitution and in
contradiction with German laws. The party calls for restrictions on the construction of
mosques and minarets as well as the full-face veil in public. The party also demands
the complete closure of the EU’s external border as well as the sealing of German
borders. Failed asylum applicants, the AfD suggests, must be returned or expelled
immediately and financial incentive should be put in place in order to encourage them
to return to their countries of origin.
Populist parties take advantage of particular historical circumstances, such as
economic or refugee crises that can and have facilitated their upsurge.146 A fact even
they contend with. “The migration crisis was the catalyst for our success,” Petry told
the Guardian. The party’s leader in the Brandenburg state parliament, Alexander
Gauland, went even further calling the refugee influx “a gift from heaven”.147 The
party has since been trying to emulate FN ideas and continuing to capitalize on
discontent with the management of the refugee crisis.
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4.6 The Mainstream Parties Move to Coopt
Soon, Merkel began backtracking on her pledge to admit refugees, in large
part because the anti-immigration messages of the AfD had gained political traction.
“We took on board the concerns of the people, who are worried about the future, and
this means we want to reduce, we want to drastically decrease the number of people
coming to us,” Merkel told ARD in 2016.148 “The most important thing in the coming
months is repatriation, repatriation and once more, repatriation,” Merkel said.149 By
2017, Merkel’s co-opting became even more pronounced. She launched a program
that offered financial incentives for migrants to voluntarily return home.150 She also
sought to speed up the deportation of failed asylum applications, policy proposals
already outlined in the April-May 2016 AfD party platform. In December 2016, she
announced to her party that she would support a ban on the burqa, another AfD
proposal. An opinion poll conducted in August 2016 showed that 51 percent of
respondents support the banning of the full-face veil.151 “In interpersonal
communication, which plays a fundamental role here, we show our face,”152 she said.
“And that’s why a full veil is inappropriate in our country. It should be banned
wherever legally possible.” “It does not belong in our country,” she said of the burqa,
“we don’t want any parallel societies. Our law takes precedence before tribal rules,
codes of honor, and Shari’a.”153 It later emerged that very few women actually don

148

Read: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-germany-idUSKBN0TW0SB20151213
Read: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-refugees-repatriation-idUSKCN1175TI
150
Read: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-offer-asylum-seekers-1200euros-voluntarily-return-home-countries-refugees-crisis-merkel-a7561701.html
151
More on burqa ban: http://www.dw.com/en/survey-germans-want-a-burqa-ban/a-19504358
152
Full article: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/06/world/europe/merkel-calls-for-ban-on-full-faceveils-in-germany.html
153
See more of speech: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-burqa-burka-banveils-angela-merkel-cdu-muslims-speech-refugee-crisis-elections-term-vote-a7458536.html
149

57

the burqa in Germany, her speech thus seemed directly aimed at courting right wing
supporters and at neutralizing the AfD.
4.7 The EU Turkey Deal
In addition to moving to the right on the refugee question in domestic politics,
Merkel also devised a foreign policy response to the political problem she faced on
account of the AfD hardline on immigration and asylum. On March 18, 2016, with
Germany serving as the moving force, the EU signed a deal with Turkey. In exchange
for stemming the flow of migrants and take back Syrian refugees coming from its
territory, Turkey would receive financial aid, visa liberation for Turkish nationals
entering the EU, and accelerated EU membership talks. Human rights groups
slammed the transactional approach to the deal, which focused on swapping favors,
on policing and curbing the numbers of arrivals to the EU, rather than ensuring the
rights of refugees under international law. “The EU-Turkey deal has been a disaster
for the thousands who have been left stranded in a dangerous, desperate and
seemingly endless limbo on the Greek islands,” said Gauri van Gulik, Amnesty
International’s deputy director for Europe said. “It is disingenuous in the extreme that
European leaders are touting the EU-Turkey deal as a success, while closing their
eyes to the unbearably high cost to those suffering the consequences,” she added. The
deal, however, is now wavering amid tensions between the two sides amplified by a
recent row with the Netherlands and Germany who prevented Turkish officials from
speaking in rallies. Turkey has also charged that the aid pledges have been too slow to
arrive, further casting doubt on the long-term maintenance of the deal.154
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4.8 Conclusion
Unlike in France, which I will discuss in the following chapter, where a strong
right wing populist party has been a present feature of the political party system since
the 1980s, right wing populism is more recent in Germany. The AfD, Germany’s
most successful populist party to date has had limited success compared to the FN in
France. Some scholars have suggested that Germany’s Nazi past has made German
public less susceptible to xenophobia than the rest of Europe. German people’s
response to the recent refugee crisis puts this theory into question. The German
example also shows that opposition to migration is not based on economic anxiety
nor on high unemployment rates, as is commonly suggested. Instead it is the result of
mainstream leaders seizing ownership of populist ideas before they become
exclusively associated with the populist right wing. The AfD party in a short amount
of time was able to put together a political agenda that completely rejects the
principle of allowing in Muslim migrants, primarily on the basis that they are
different. Merkel most concerned with being re-elected to a fourth term in office,
backtracked not only on a policy proposal but a principle she was trying to advance of
an open and accepting Germany. This puts into question her commitments to human
rights and to her own principles. She opted instead to outdo her own policies and
appropriate AfD ideas. Merkel who in 2015 declared that assisting refugees was a
humanitarian duty, then moved to advance programs that would drastically reduce
their presence, for the sole purpose of alleviating political pressure. This points to the
fact that Merkel’s move to assist refugees was a political decision, rather than a
humanitarian one. The maneuver seems to have worked as Merkel climbed back up in
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the polls while the AfD has lost about a third of its support, ahead of the September
2017 elections. 155 It remains to be seen what impact this will have on the AfD and on
right wing populism in Germany in the long-term.
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Chapter 5: Case Study France
France is home to the most famous radical right wing party in Europe, the
Front National (FN). Various scholars consider it the prototype of populist parties
because of its archetypal extreme right characteristics as well as its decades-old
influence on France’s party-system.156 The FN, under the leadership of Jean Marie Le
Pen was created in 1972 initially as a federation of disparate forces of the French far
right: Poujadists,157 neofascists as well as supporters of colonialism and war time
collaborationism. In its early years, the party failed to make significant electoral gains
mainly because it was torn by internal disagreements and voters dismissed it as far
too extremist.158
The party’s main preoccupation has been since its inception, on the defense of
French national identity and values against foreign and domestic enemies,
immigrants, the elites and the political establishment.159 Le Pen, a former paratrooper,
was infamous for his anti-Semitism and dismissal of the Nazi gas chambers as “a
mere detail” of World War II history. In the 1983 local elections, the tide of the FN
began to rise. An alliance with a center-right list reached in order to defeat the
Socialist party in the small town of Dreux, resulted in clear victory with 55 percent of
the vote and three FN candidates placed as councilors.160 This gave the FN the
political legitimacy as well as the visibility it needed. The following year, the FN
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emerged as a force to be reckoned with when it won 11.2 percent in the European
elections and 10 seats in the European Parliament.
Scholars point to the early 1980s as being marked by pessimism. An
economic recession, government imposed austerity measures, mounting social tension
over unemployment and growing crime rates translated into declining faith in the
Socialist government. They also point to a marked rise in foreign migration. This
provided an opportunity for the FN to capitalize on economic discontent as well as on
a sudden change in society.161 In the early years, Le Pen voters were mostly residents
of large or medium-sized cities, who proved more susceptible to its anti-immigration
and law and order messages. The party’s strongholds were generally in the most
urban and industrialized regions of France. Its most solid support was drawn from
small shopkeepers and blue-collar workers. Due to its conservative positions on
gender issues and its extremist image, it appealed to more men than women. What
appealed most to Le Pen voters, however, was its signature topic, immigration.
5.1 Immigration to France
France’s encounter with immigration has been influenced by its colonial
legacy as well as its tradition of recruiting foreign workers starting in the early 20th
century. The first major wave of Muslim migrants arrived in 1962, at the end of the
Algerian War. Some 60,000 harkis, or Algerian auxiliaries in the French army, settled
in France.162 Migration of Algerian non-combatants also rose following its
independence from France in 1962. Migrants from France’s other former colonies in
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North Africa, Morocco and Tunisia as well as sub-Saharan Africa also make up the
country’s migrant population. Together Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians,
Maghrebins, or North African Arabs, make up the largest immigrant group in
France.163
The post war economic growth spurt of the so-called “trentes glorieuses”
resulted in hundreds of thousands of recruited labor migrants from Europe as well as
additional migrant workers from North Africa. The economic crisis of the early
1970s, however, transformed France’s relationship to immigration. In 1974, France
officially ended its labor migration policy. Immigrants continued to arrive, however
through family reunification, applying for asylum and entering illegally. Starting in
the early 1980s and propelled by the anti-immigration campaign of the FN, the
discourse on immigration began to shift away from labor and towards national
identity. Maghrebins, given their relatively larger numbers became the focus of the
discussion. For Le Pen, North Africans were a particular threat to national cultural
because of their fundamental and insurmountable difference: they were Muslims.164
For the FN, Islam is an alien culture and religion. FN leader Bruno Megret
said that North Africans want to stay loyal to their difference and “stay
themselves.”165 The party claimed that Islam is a conquering religion whose
expansionist force threatens the Christian identity of the West. This is manifested in
the 2010 campaign slogan Non a l’Islamism, no to Islamism which featured a map of
France draped in the Algerian flag with minarets piercing through it, beside it a
163
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caricatured woman donning a full-face black veil.166 For the FN, Islam is
incompatible with features of French society and threatens the core value of laïcité as
laid out in Article 1 of the French constitution, which formally states that France is a
secular republic. The religious dimension of North African immigration thus has had
a particular significance for the FN, and they have painted Islam as an intrinsically
provocative religion as well as a threatening force to France’s secularism.167
Unlike Germany’s perception of foreigners, the FN does not specifically
address biological or racial differences between the French natives and the foreigners,
nor has it specifically laid out racial features as necessary to becoming French.
Instead, the FN speaks of “merit,” immigrants must earn the right to become French
citizens through proving their willingness to assimilate. Assimilation however is not
simply having a job and speaking the French language, it entails the shedding of all
foreign cultures, religions, languages and traditions. “To be assimilated one needs
first of all to respect and share the spiritual, moral and cultural values (of the nation).
These need to be strong and dynamic enough to make people want to abandon their
own values,”168 Le Pen said. For Le Pen the presence of foreigners wishing to
preserve aspects of their cultural identity is a direct danger to French identity.169 His
corollary is that the inclusion of foreigners into French society leads to
multiculturalism, which in turn will result in the erosion and even disappearance of
French identity. Le Pen depicted the French natives as victims of this intrusion and
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this threat and portrayed immigrants as oppressors of the French people.170 The only
solution, the FN declared, was to prioritize French citizens and for foreign migrants to
return home, an irony given French colonial history. The party’s policy proposals
included ending social benefits for immigrants, ending intercultural teaching in
schools and stopping family unification applications for immigrants. In the “50
concrete measures” against immigration laid out in the 1991 platform, the party called
for the repatriation of foreigners to their home countries and the expulsion of
undocumented and unemployed migrants. The FN also proposed detaining
immigrants while their deportation was pending on the theory that this would
discourage new migrants from coming. In addition, the party proposed measures such
as a ban on constructing more mosques.171
5.2 Co-option
The FN’s messages resonated strongly with the French public. Starting in
1986, Le Pen’s party began to surge in the polls. It won 9.7 percent of the vote in the
legislative elections and in 1988 garnered 14 percent in the first round of presidential
elections, cementing the FN’s status as a force to be reckoned with. The party’s
staunch anti-immigration stance, which became widely popular among French voters,
has played a significant role in shaping the country's immigration policy.172
Mainstream French leaders, in an attempt to counter Le Pen’s influence, sought to not
only co-opt the FN’s policy proposals but its rhetoric too. Even socialist leaders
began taking on restrictive policies and tone on migration.
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In the 1990s, center-right Republican Jacques Chirac in an attempt largely
regarded by scholars at trying to win back the electorate that he lost to the FN in the
election, implemented the Pasqua laws which facilitated the expulsion of immigrants
and gave local leaders and mayors a say over who should be sent back – localizing
the debate on migration. The Pasqua laws were officially enforced in 1993 and
introduced what became known as the government’s “zero immigration” policy,
which made it extremely difficult for foreigners to gain legal status in France. The
laws required proof of uninterrupted housing and employment to renew residency. It
also took away the right of those born on French soil to gain citizenship: children
born in France to foreign parents have to wait until age 18 to apply for French
nationality. These laws were aimed primarily at stemming the flow of immigration
from North Africa.173 The Pasqua laws drew strong condemnation from the United
Nations who said the laws trapped foreigners in “Kafkaesque limbo.” The report
noted that under the Pasqua laws if migrants are married to French nationals or are
parents of children born in France, they cannot be expelled, but they also do not
qualify for legal residence or work permits. During this period, France's deportation
figures increased, sparking protests. The sans papier, people without legal
documents, mobilized and demonstrated in the streets. The center of the protests was
France’s working-class suburbs, built during the postwar period to house workers in
the outer cities’ limits. Over the decades, they have become neglected ghettos and
even today remain powerful symbols of France’s treatment of its minority groups.
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In 1991, Chirac said that having Spanish, Polish or Portuguese immigrants
poses fewer problems than Muslims or blacks. “How do you think a French worker
feels when he sees a family, a man who has maybe 3 or 4 wives and some 20
children, make more money than him around 50,000 francs in social services of
course, without working,” he said. “If you add to the noise and the smell, it’s no
wonder the French worker becomes mad, it is not racist to say this,” he added. 174 The
comments drew a strong reaction from the media who quickly likened his tone to that
of Le Pen who responded, “Jacques Chirac uses the same discourse as the FN while
vilifying the FN and saying it is extremist. This is a contradiction,” he said, “one
which he [Chirac] should face, or the voters should take note of.”175
The FN has had a direct impact through its policy-making capacities, as well
an indirect impact on immigration policy in France by influencing the strategic
decisions of the mainstream parties, their alliances and their policy proposals. The
FN’s early electoral success was due to its ability to harness some first time voters as
well as attracting a significant number of people who typically voted for the
mainstream right wing.176 Mainstream parties in an attempt to recapture the lost
voters and prevent further loss, have elected to co-opt issues advanced by the populist
parties at the same time refusing to officially align themselves with Le Pen, his
proposals ideas, or recognize that he is the source. Meanwhile the FN has been
successful not only in attracting and holding on to voters but also in influencing the
priority of voters who support other political parties – further creating incentives for

174

See full text in French: https://lesquen2017.com/2016/05/08/le-vivre-ensemble-est-un-mythe/
Watch full video in French: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e4pun9Cdp6Q
176
Guiraudon, V. and Lahav, G. (2006). Special issue on immigration policy in Europe. 1st ed.
Abingdon, UK: Routledge. p, 72
175

67

the mainstream to co-opt their ideas, as refusing would spell their demise. The FN
without ever having participated in a government was able to impact the entire
political sphere and cause a realignment of the party system in terms of framing the
issue of migration and establishing it as an important social, economic and political
priority. The FN’s influence on the national political agenda has placed issues of
migration and national identity at the top of political electoral issues, shaped how it is
perceived and dictated how it ought to be dealt with.
5.3 Earthquake
The 2002 French presidential elections produced an “earthquake” in French
politics, or so newspaper headlines at the time described it. In the first round, Le
Pen’s campaign slogan, “Two million unemployed workers equal two million
immigrants,” catapulted him past the Socialist candidate Lionel Jospin into second
place in a surprise showing. His run-off against the incumbent, Chirac, galvanized the
French public and led a massive mobilization of the left, who were in utter panic that
Le Pen could become president. Faced with either a right-center candidate or a fascist
as they termed Le Pen, left wing voters were forced to cast their vote for Chirac.
Hundreds of most notably young people took to the streets “Vote for a crook, not for
a fascist” was their rallying cry.177 Chirac won 82.2 percent of the vote in the second
round, while Le Pen won 17.8 percent.
Aiming to avoid a repeat of 2002, Nicholas Sarkozy, the candidate of the
center-right Union for a Popular Movement (UMP),178 took on anti-immigration and
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identity politics as a main topic in his 2007 presidential campaign. Political observers
quickly noted that his policy proposals on immigration control and integration had
significantly diverged from the party’s traditional stand on these issues. Sarkozy set
ambitious quotas for the deportation of illegal residents (25,000 a year) and passed
laws to restrict family reunification under the guise of immigration choisie, chosen
migration based on skilled labor rather than immigration determined by family
reunification. “If people don't like being in France they only have to leave. We’ve had
more than enough of always having the feeling that we must apologize for being
French. We cannot change our laws our habits or our customs because they don’t
please a tiny minority,” he said in an interview.179 Sarkozy was blasted in the media
after the interview for “stealing” Le Pen’s campaign slogan that year, Aimez la ou
quittez la, “France love it or leave it.”180 In another example of appropriation of the
theme of national identity from the FN, Sarkozy added “National Identity” to the
name of the Ministry of Immigration and Integration. Defending himself against
accusations that he was adopting Le Pen’s positions to woo voters from the far right,
Sarkozy defiantly said, “If Le Pen says ‘the sun is yellow’ should I say it’s blue?” he
asked, arguing that he was just using “common sense” in the immigration debate.181
His strategy seemed to work. The 2007 elections ended with a massive shift of
FN voters toward Sarkozy in the first round, leaving Le Pen with only 10 percent of
the vote, disqualifying him from the second round.182 Surveys conducted at the time
demonstrated that between 21 and 38 percent of Le Pen’s 2002 electorate voted for
179
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Sarkozy in the first round of the 2007 elections. 183 Two-thirds of Le Pen voters voted
for Sarkozy in the second round.184 Sarkozy defeated his Socialist rival Ségolène
Royal in the second round, by winning 53 percent of the vote.185
French observers speak of a profound Lepenisation186 of France and French
society, whereby Le Pen’s ideas have become so deeply ingrained in political and
social life that they have become permanent. This is a remarkable feat in a country
with a strong liberal and left-wing tradition. And thus if 2007 proved to be a setback
for the FN as a party, it amounted to a clear victory of Le Pen’s ideas. Sarkozy had
legitimized, mainstreamed and implemented Le Pen’s rhetoric and the very principle
of limiting migration at the expense of the social and human rights of the migrant
population in France. The year 2007 would prove to be only a minor setback for the
FN. As Le Pen repeatedly said, in the long run it might even bring more supporters
who always prefer “the original to the copy.187
5.4 Marine Le Pen
In 2011 in a major shakeup, Marine Le Pen, Jean Marie’s youngest daughter
took over leadership of the FN after winning an internal vote. “Politically, barring a
few subtleties, she holds the same opinions as me,”188 Le Pen the father said of his
daughter after her formal inauguration. Marine Le Pen nonetheless sought to distance
herself from her father and his anti-Semitism, while staying true to the party’s base
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and anti-immigrant policy plank as a central feature of the platform. Since taking over
she has significantly broadened the party’s appeal by expelling extremists. In 2015 in
a very public feud she ejected her father from the party after hailing notorious French
wartime collaborationist Philippe Petain in an interview.189 Since taking over at the
helm, Le Pen has sought ways to modulate her father’s tone with her own style.
In 2010, Le Pen compared Muslims praying in the streets to Nazi occupation
of France. “I’m sorry, but for those who really like to talk about the second world
war, if we’re talking about occupation, we could talk about that (street prayers),
because that is clearly an occupation of the territory,” she said at an FN rally in
Lyons. “There are no tanks, there are no soldiers, but it is an occupation anyhow, and
it weighs on people.”190 Rather than condemn her remarks, Sarkozy called for a
national debate on Islam and secularism. Following the debate, interior minister
Claude Guéant promised a countrywide ban on street prayer “within months”, saying
the “street is for driving in, not praying”.191 Guéant said in Le Figaro newspaper
“Praying in the street is not dignified for religious practice and violates the principles
of secularism and it hurts the sensitivities of many of our fellow citizens.” Muslim
groups argued that worshippers are forced to pray in the street on Fridays in the
absence of large enough mosques. Building more is difficult, they argued, as
according to French law, mosques and other religious houses of worship must be
funded privately given the restrictions against using public money for religious
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purposes.192 In 2011, the ban on public prayer was imposed in Paris, forcing
worshippers to use nearby abandoned buildings.
Le Pen has been particularly successful in the campaigns she has launched on
what she calls the “special demands” of the Muslim community. In 2014, Le Pen
successfully campaigned to remove “non pork” meal options in school canteens. “We
will accept no religious requirements in the school lunch menus,” she declared in an
interview. “There is no reason for religion to enter into the public sphere.”193 She said
that such provisions are aimed at “shattering secularism” and “creating special rules
that would allow Muslims to behave differently.” 194 Le Pen has thus positioning
herself as a defender of French secularism against Muslim migrants who want to
impose their values on France. Public opinion has been squarely on her side. In 2014,
53 percent believed that Muslims were accorded “too many rights.” 195
In the runoff round of the 2012 presidential elections, Le Pen started yet
another controversy by saying that all meat in Paris was halal – killed by cutting the
animal's throat and letting its blood drain out. She used this as proof that the
government was bowing down to “Islamic radicals.” “This situation is deception and
the government has been fully aware of it for months,” Le Pen said. “All the abattoirs
of the Paris region have succumbed to the rules of a minority. We have reason to be
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disgusted.” 196 It later emerged that the vast majority of the meat in France was not
slaughtered in conformity with halal practices. Few believed that the uproar had
anything to do with how animals were slaughtered or who eats them, it was clear that
the real purpose of the meat controversy was to stoke anxieties about the erosion of
French national identity. In the 2012 election, Le Pen secured 13.6 percent of the vote
in the first round of elections and 17.9 percent in the second, beating her father’s best
ever score. 197 Socialist Party leader Francois Hollande was elected president.
5.5 Refugee Crisis
As migration continued to be a hot-button political issue in France’s politics,
the refugee crisis created by the Syrian government’s crackdown on the 2011
uprising, proved a welcome boost for Le Pen’s popularity and her agenda. France was
not a major destination for asylum seekers, largely because of its well-known high
unemployment rate, its excessive red tape and its unwelcoming attitude towards
refugees. Asylum seekers instead preferred to try to head to Germany, Sweden and
Britain. Officials however said that 80,000 people had applied for asylum in France
since 2011, a record number. France also came under pressure to contribute to
resettling some of the refugees who had arrived in Italy and Greece, adding pressure
on Hollande’s government. After initially rejecting a quota system for resettling
refugees across the EU, in 2015 France agreed to resettle 30,000 Syrians from Italy
and Greece over a two-year period, a limited number given France’s size and its
existing migrant population.
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Germany had also requested that France take in some who had reached
Germany. “We won’t take any more, Prime Minister Manuel Valls said in response in
2016. “France never said 'come to France,’”198 he added in a reference to Germany’s
open door policy. But it was France’s treatment of asylum seekers in the camp in
Calais that symbolized France’s failure to effectively deal with the refugees on its
territory. Hundreds who had hoped to reach Britain through the French town of Calais
in northern France, some wishing to join relatives already there, others planning to
seek work believing that jobs are more available than in France, were trapped on a
former landfill sight, as the UK refused to accept them, citing the Dublin Regulation
rules. France, arguing that the refugees did not want to remain in the country, refused
to assist them. Though the estimates have varied greatly, a refugee agency said over
8,000 people among them 1,300 unaccompanied children for months lived in the
squalid and over-crowded Calais camp, “the Jungle” as it came to be known. Charity
organizations provided meals for the camp’s residents, as the French government
hesitated to offer assistance, worrying it would lure more migrants. In October 2016
after a two-year standoff between France and the UK, authorities relocated most of
the people to other holding facilities around Paris. The camp was destroyed multiple
times as former residents kept returning, believing it was a better option than the over
crowded housing facilities they were offered. In March 2017 the mayor of Calais
banned the distribution of food to migrants as part of a campaign to prevent the
establishment of a new camp, drawing more condemnations from charity groups.199
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5.6 Le Pen on the Crisis
Le Pen’s position on all asylum seekers — “illegals” as the FN calls them —
“strain our public accounts” at the expense of “our own,” she told party activists in
Marseille. 200 “Migrants are now wandering in our neighborhoods, around the train
stations or in the slums, causing for France immense security and public hygiene
problems,” she told the audience. The majority of asylum seekers are in fact
economically motivated migrants, she added. “I think that the political refugees are an
ultra-minority. To prove this I only need to show the images that I see on television. I
have seen the images of the illegal immigrants coming, arriving in Germany from
Hungary and other place. And of course, 99% of these images are of men,” she said,
“I think that the men who flee their country and leave their family there, are not doing
it to flee persecution. This is obviously done for economic reasons.”201 Families are in
the “ultra-minority,” Le Pen said. In violation of international law, which guarantees
protections to people fleeing war and conflict, she said asylum should only be granted
to those being persecuted by their own government because of something they did or
said.202
During the EU led initiative to redistribute 160,000 migrants who had arrived
to Greece and Italy Le Pen said: “We’re told to accept 160,000 illegal immigrants this
year, but next year it will be 700,000 and the following it will be 1.2m,” she said
during a party meeting in Marseille.203 She also accused Germany of seeking to
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recruit low-wage migrant “slaves” to replace its aging workforce.204 An Odoxa poll
published in Le Parisien in September 2015 found that 55 percent of French citizens
were opposed to emulating Germany’s decision to soften asylum rules for Syrian
refugees. Nearly two-thirds of those surveyed said migrants came for economic
reasons.205 In another poll in 2014, 55 percent of respondents said there were too
many immigrants in France.206
Le Pen had been parlaying the French public’s fear of Islam for years before
the Paris attack killed 129 people in 2015; but that event made her message far more
appealing. Pointing to the discovery of a Syrian passport near the remains of one of
the suicide bombers at the national soccer stadium, Le Pen seized the opportunity
immediately. “France and the French,” she warned a day after the attacks,” are no
longer safe.” She demanded a crackdown on “Islamists” in the country. She proposed,
“to expel foreigners who preach hatred on our soil.” A poll conducted days after
found that 94 percent of French people were in favor of this proposal.207 Hollande
tried to modulate the proposal with plans to strip French citizenship only from dualnationality citizens208 who are convicted of terrorism209 as part of amendments aimed
at fighting terrorism, but it back fired. His party accused him of betraying the values
of the left and the French Republic. The parliament also rejected the proposal –
204
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forcing him to abandon the plan.210 The refugee crisis clearly worked to Le Pen’s
advantage. Whereas in 2009 the FN won 6.3 percent of the vote, in the 2014 elections
it gained nearly 25 percent.211 The 2017 presidential elections ushered in renewed
success for Le Pen. She won 21.7% of the vote in the first round propelling her into
the second round. She came into second place, beating her Republican and Socialist
adversaries to third and fifth place respectively.
5.7 Conclusion
Marine Le Pen, and her father before her have succeeded in pulling the
political center of gravity in France to the right, forcing center-right as well as
Socialist party leaders to adopt stricter anti-immigration laws on migration and
restricting the religious and social freedoms of the Muslim community. Le Pen has
succeeded in reformulating her father’s principles into coherent political strategies,
which have gained strong support among the French public. Far from her father’s
often-nonsensical racist rants, she offers solutions to on-going grievances. A talented
public speaker with a great deal of charisma, Le Pen has managed to present herself
and her party as a legitimate alternative to mainstream parties. In 2011, 38 percent of
respondents believed that the FN was a mainstream party representing right wing
patriotism and traditional values. In 2016, the number rose to 46 percent.212 By
appealing to nationalism, she has managed to hold on to her father’s blue-collar male
supporters, and by defending secularism she has succeeded in gaining the support of
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more women and youth. She has also succeeded in convincing the majority of French
people that her analysis of French problems and her criticism of the French
mainstream are accurate. In 2014, 56 percent believed that Marine le Pen grasps dayto-day French problems. The policies implemented during the latest refugee crisis,
have thus been a symptom as well as a result of the constant shifting to the right in
public opinion and in the leadership. The growing acceptability and popularity of the
FN points to the life cycle of ideas, from fringe to mainstream, it also shows that the
appropriation of ideas fails to undermine right wing populist parties, especially on the
long-term. It has the opposite effect. It legitimizes right wing ideas and turns them
into laws, it gives them mainstream acceptability, shedding them of their fringe
source and legalizes them. It also further incentivizes populist leaders into coming up
with more radical ideas to pitch to the public.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
There are no easy or inexpensive solutions to mass migration. By 2015,
Turkey which hosts the largest refugee population in the world, had spent $7.6 billion
providing for the basic needs of some 2.2 million refugees on its territory213 and
Germany said it had spent 20 billion euros ($21 billion) in 2016 on assistance to
refugees.214 Indeed the Syrian conflict alone has displaced nearly 6 million people out
of a total 65.3 million refugees worldwide. 215 The resulting burden has strained the
states that are hosting them as well as the human rights groups mandated with
assisting them. What the refugee crisis in Europe has shown is that no country,
certainly not Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Greece or Italy, who are currently hosting the
majority of Syrian refugees, can or are willing to cope with the flows alone. The
refugee challenge is enormous. No country or bloc can have a no-limit policy on
refugees, as states have finite resources and capabilities to accept refugees. But no
country can, or indeed should, block people fleeing war or persecution from reaching
safety. This creates a distinct conundrum especially for liberal mainstream leaders. If
they liberalize their policies on migration and allow more refugees to come in, they
empower the populist right’s agenda and undermine their own position. If they
restrict their asylum laws, they undermine their legal and moral obligations and
endorse populist proposals. Meanwhile thousands of refugees continue to make their
way towards Europe by sea, using riskier routes and flimsier ships as smugglers
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attempt to bypass authorities. According to the IOM, almost 33,715 people reached
European shores in 2017 alone, while 795 have drowned or gone missing.216
In this thesis, I have discussed the ways in which the refugee crisis has
contributed to the rise of populist right wing parties in Europe. These parties have
succeeded in putting the flows of people seeking safety in Europe high on the
political agenda by framing it as a negative and destructive force, by linking it to
people’s most immediate concerns: their financial security, their employment
prospects and their very identity. These high-voltage messages have persuaded public
opinion and influenced people who do not even vote for far-right parties. These
parties have also been able to significantly influence the political sphere by pressuring
governments to implement restrictive policies on migration and asylum.
I have shown that right wing populism necessitates an “other” that is
constructed through a discourse that plays to public fears about safety and identity.
Refugees are not one homogenous group or entity, neither are Europeans. Yet
populism posits a neatly defined “us,” a hard working, good and moral group, versus
“them,” an alien, suspect and dangerous interloper. During the refugee crisis, “us”
was the native Christian population of Europe under threat, “them” was the
economically driven illegal migrants and potential terrorists. Populist parties called
for the exclusion of refugees by shutting their national borders, rejecting asylum
applications and limiting refugees’ access to public services.
By turning the flow of migrants into an enormous crisis for Europe, they have
established that it is vital for every citizen to have a firm opinion on the matter.
Indeed the fact that migration in the long run is a net profit for states, that the
216
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assistance of refugees is a duty under international signed agreements, that it is well
within Europe’s economic and political means to effectively deal with the situation
and that Europe’s aging population could benefit from young workers, or that it is a
moral obligation – all of these considerations have been conspicuously absent from
the discussion on the merits of migration or the assistance of refugees. Instead,
irrational fear has dominated the discourse on migration. In this respect right wing
populist parties have had enormous influence. In most countries in Europe these
parties have gone from fringe movements twenty years ago, to ruling governments in
Switzerland, Poland and in Hungary. In Austria, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and
Norway, populist parties are in the top three largest parties.
I have shown that right wing populist parties have been mobilizing opposition
to migration long before the onset of the crisis and their influence has proved to be
greater than their electorate success suggests. Indeed over the years they have
managed to curb the religious and social freedoms of Europe’s minority Muslim
population by helping to put in place legislation that has banned religious attire, the
building of new mosques and minarets, and prayer in the street.
The achievements of populist right wing parties and movements should thus
be understood both by considering their electoral power as well as in the triumph of
their ideas, as manifested by the mainstream parties decisions to appropriate their
proposals in order not to lose political ground. I have shown for instance how 2 years
after announcing Germany would welcome refugees with open arms, Chancellor
Angela Merkel put in place financial incentives for their voluntary return – a policy
proposal that had previously been advanced by the Alternative for Germany party
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(AfD). Her gambit worked as the upstart party and its electoral prospects are now in
decline. Despite the AfD’s limited electoral power, it has succeeded in forcing
Merkel’s Social Democratic Party to move to the right on refugee policy and even to
borrow some of their discourse. Likewise in France, the Front National (FN) has
mounted successful campaigns that have resulted in center-right and Socialist leaders
imposing bans on headscarves and limitations on family unification applications for
migrants. The French example is useful because it provides an insight into the
potential long-term effects of mainstream parties’ borrowing tactic: it backfires. It
also leads to increased popularity and acceptability of the populist leaders and their
ideas. The FN, considered a radical fringe party in the 1970s, is now a top contender
in the local as well as presidential elections and a major mover and shaker of ideas. It
remains to be seen whether a similar result will unfold in Germany.
Though establishment leaders have been concerned with their own ability to
control and influence public opinion on migration, they have failed to provide
coherent policies during their election campaigns and they have hesitated to act
decisively with the matter effectively during times of crises. This has forced them to
play catch up during the refugee crisis, having to reverse policies already in place or
employ ad hoc crisis-management maneuvers meant to undo political damage.
Populist parties have thus successfully laid bare the inherent weakness of
establishment parties: that of lacking their own concrete positions on migration and
lacking a principled dedication to the cause of human rights. They are, after all,
strategic actors willing to compromise on their positions and even to completely back
track from them when faced with the prospect of losing public support and, in
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consequence, votes. Their concern with the rise of populism and fear about losing
their political base has shunted to the sidelines their values-based concern for the
plight of refugees. This is particularly true of the socialist and social democratic
parties. As a result, mainstream leaders’ behavior has often been reactionary, strategic
and self-interested rather than principled. This, of course, has had many unfortunate
consequences for minority rights and the rights of asylum seekers.
The increased restrictions have had tangible negative effects on the lives and
futures of thousands of people. Fewer than 14,500 refugees have been relocated from
the overcrowded camps in Greece and Italy under the two-year plan that was
supposed to resettle 160,000 people.217 Elsewhere in Europe, Hungarian Prime
Minister Victor Orban has housed all asylum seekers in shipping containers and
prohibited them from leaving the premises while their applications are evaluated.
Germany has been deporting failed asylum seekers from Afghanistan back to their
country—notable given that Afghanistan is the world’s second largest refugee
producing country.218 Austria passed a bill that would deny accommodation and food
assistance to failed asylum applicants.219 For the thousands throughout Europe who
are still waiting for final word on their asylum applications, they find themselves in
legal limbo and living in makeshift housing or on the street. There have been other
dismaying signs of the unwelcoming, even hostile attitudes toward refugees. Three
men died in the Greek island of Moria in January 2017. Pictures later emerged of
their flimsy makeshift tent camp covered in heavy snow, prompting the Greek
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government to move the refugees to warmer shelters.220 Many have also been
suffering from daily attacks. German authorities reported 3,533 attacks on refugees
across Germany in 2015, which left 560 people injured, among them 43 children.221
European officials have been slow to condemn these attacks, paving the way
for xenophobic populist leaders to continue to shape public perceptions of refugees as
economically driven opportunists with little to contribute to society, as potential
security threats and foreign predators on a mission to destabilize Europe. This
conception has done a profound injustice to the lives and futures of refugees whose
fates depend on the resolution of complicated conflicts back home and on decisions
about their asylum applications that are completely outside of their control.
I have shown how the radical ideas advanced by the populist right have been
so powerful that they have altered the entire political atmosphere. Their conceptions
have become an inextricable part of European political discourse. Supporting the
assistance of migrants for instance, has become a political position in and of itself that
implies opposition to populist parties. Meanwhile the opposition to immigration has
become the dominant, mainstream sentiment. Establishment leaders focused on reelections have seized populists’ proposals in an effort to neutralize their opponents,
but in the process they have legitimized these ideas and in some cases legitimized
their radical challengers. Ideas that were once considered fringe have now become
acceptable and have become cemented into policies. But it does not end there.
Populist leaders are then prompted by political self-preservation to come up with new
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proposals, potentially more radical ones in an effort to remain relevant, putting into
motion a new life cycle of ideas all over again.
The refugee crisis has transformed Europe. It has sparked the increasing
influence of right wing populist parties that has not only shaped refugee policy, but
also undermined cooperation in the world’s most integrated bloc. There is striking
evidence of this. In 2016, the majority of British citizens voted in favor of a
referendum advanced by populist leaders to leave the EU and put a limit on
migration. The departure of the UK, apart from incurring economic costs on the EU
has also buoyed populist and Euroskeptic leaders in France, the Netherlands, Italy,
Austria and Sweden to call for holding similar referendums on their own EU
memberships – threatening the survival of a bloc that took decades to forge.
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Electoral success of right wing populist parties in Europe in
2012-2017 presidential elections

In percent

source: http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/countries.html

Fidesz (ruling government): Hungarian civil union; JOBBIK: Movement for a better Hungary;
PiS (ruling government): Law and Justice party; K: Kukiz’15; SVP (largest party): Swiss
People’s Party; DF: Danish People’s Party; PS: True Finns; FRP: Progress Party; FN: Front
National; PVV: Party for Freedom; SD: Swedish democrats; UKIP: United Kingdom
Independence Party; XA: Golden Dawn; AfD: Alternative for Germany; LN: Northern League.

Right wing populist parties electoral results since 1985

Results are in percent
PiS: Law and Justice Party (Poland); SVP: Swiss People’s Party (Switzerland); DF:
Danish People’s Party (Denmark); KRF: Progress Party (Norway); FN: Front
National (France); PVV: Party for Freedom (Netherlands); SD: Swedish Democrats
(Sweden); UKIP: United Kingdom Independence Party (UK)
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Breakdown of total number of refugees settled
under the EU *

source: UNHCR

As of 06 April 2017

*In September 2015, the EU agreed on a two-year plan to relocate asylum-seekers
from Greece and Italy to other EU Member States.

Distribution of Syrian refugees

Source: UNHCR 2016 statistics
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